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Introduction: The Benefits of 
Scientifically Based Foresight
Lars Brozus
The future is always in large parts unknown and unknow­
able. But the degree to which we can anticipate future con­
sequences o f current decisions and the degree to which we 
can keep the future open for  later choices and changes is 
certainly variable -  as well as the degree to which we sub­
mit unreflectively to the past, to cultural traditions and his­
torically pre-given assumptions. (Bernhard Peters)*
A cursory review o f the m ost notable foreign policy and security crises of 
recent decades reveals that genuine surprises (“black swans”) are very 
rare.1 Of course the collapse o f the Soviet Union, the 9/11 attacks and the 
popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East took m ost politi­
cians and analysts by surprise, and each o f these events was followed by 
painstaking discussions about how such decisive developments could have 
been overlooked. Unsurprisingly, in retrospect it is much easier to identify 
the “critical junctures”.
With hindsight, however, it also becomes evident that pointers and 
warnings existed in all o f these cases, both in research analyses and in offi­
cial documents. The worsening nationality crisis in the USSR, al-Qaeda's 
plans to attack the United States, and the growing dissatisfaction with the 
conditions o f everyday life in many Arab states were well-established facts. 
W hat was missing was adequate attention to them  at political leadership 
level. Such a constellation represents a so-called “grey swan”:2 a crisis that 
develops over a longer period in the absence o f adequate political prioriti­
sation.
W h y  F o r e s i g h t  -  A n d  H o w ?
The present collection is SWP's third Foresight publication examining the 
realm o f “grey swans”, following “Expect the Unexpected” (2011) and 
“Keep Expecting the Unexpected” (2013).3 SWP understands “foresight” as
* Bernhard Peters, “Why Is It So Hard to Change the World?”, International Sociology 9, 
no. 3 (1994): 275-93  (290).
1 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact o f  the Highly Improbable (New York, 
2007).
2 Michael J. Mazarr, “Hide in Plain Sight: The Strategic Challenge of ‘Gray Swans'”, World 
Politics Review, 24 February 2015, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/artides/15153/hide- 
in-plain-sight-the-strategic-challenge-of-gray-swans (accessed 25 September 2015); Nate 
Silver, The Signal and the Noise -  Why So Many Predictions Fail, But Some Don't (New York, 2012).
3 2011: Volker Perthes and Barbara Lippert, eds., Expect the Unexpected: Ten Situations to Keep 
an Eye On, SWP Research Paper 1/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January  
2012), http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2012_RP01_ 
lpt_prt.pdf (German version, November 2011: Ungeplant ist der Normalfall: Zehn Situationen, 
die politische Aufmerksamkeit verdienen); 2013: Volker Perthes and Barbara Lippert, eds., Un-
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a scientifically based analysis o f conceivable future situations and develop­
ments o f international foreign and security policy. These are not forecasts, 
as we cannot o f course predict what will occur. But we can draw attention 
to conceivable scenarios that -  were they to come about -  would be of 
great political relevance to Germany and the European Union.
Correspondingly, our Foresight contributions consider possible future 
events that we believe deserve greater political attention today. The start­
ing point is that the described situations take political decision-makers by 
surprise. As such they present foreign policy and security challenges, 
regardless o f the balance o f crisis and opportunity they represent. Some 
involve putative developments in the near future for which the decisive 
political actors are presently inadequately prepared. Other contributions 
concern events much further in the future and discuss developments that 
would come as a great surprise seen from today's political perspective.
What all the contributions share is the scientific rigour o f their argu­
m entation. Discussing potential future developments presents special chal­
lenges to the analyst. Because the future cannot be foreseen, such state­
ments are necessarily associated with great uncertainty. Foresight is there­
fore certainly not uncontested in academic circles -  like the retrospective 
analysis o f past events, the so-called “counterfactuals”.4 Nonetheless, we 
still believe that it is worthwhile, and in fact essential, to risk a glance at 
possible future developments. In everyday politics, the foresight approach 
is practised all the time anyway, but often without being explicitly identi­
fied as such. After all, political decisions made today always seek to shape 
the future in one way or another. Therefore, the question is not whether 
foresight is being practised but rather how this is done.
SWP subscribes to a scientifically based approach to foresight. This 
means above all explicitly revealing the assumptions and causalities that 
characterise each (imagined) scenario rather than leaving them  implicit. 
Such transparency is an essential precondition for exposing the inherent 
assumptions to identification and discussion. It represents an important 
touchstone for distinguishing diligent foresight from guesswork, and en­
ables critical debate.
Transparency is also essential for another reason. The foresight situa­
tions described in the following represent a contribution to illuminating 
the “universe o f possibilities” for political action.5 It is thereby unavoida-
geplant bleibt der Normalfall: Acht Situationen, die politische Aufmerksamkeit verdienen SWP-Studie 
16/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2013) (no English version), 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2013_S16_prt_lpt.pdf (ac­
cessed 20 October 2015).
4 Silver, The Signal and the Noise (see note 2); Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., 
Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Per­
spectives (Princeton, 1996); Philip E. Tetlock, Richard Ned Lebow and Geoffrey Parker, eds., 
Unmaking the West: “What I f  Scenarios That Rewrite World History (Ann Arbor, 2006).
5 “[C]urrent and future political choices can (and must) be made from a wide universe of 
possibilities and not from an overdetermined past that permits only one inevitable divi­
sive response.” Philip E. Tetlock and Geoffrey Parker, “Counterfactual Thought Experi-
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ble that they also play a part in form ing that universe, because the analysts 
are selecting from  all the conceivable factors, variables, trends and in­
fluences. By necessity they concentrate on those that are pertinent to their 
analysis and neglect others. Thus the reader is confronted with an, as it 
were, prestructured image o f the future that influences his or her perspec­
tive on future events. So an academically reflected approach to construct­
ing the situations is all the more im portant to preserve transparency con­
cerning the choice o f factors taken into consideration and the reasons for 
that choice. This implies that the “foreseer” should occasionally reflect 
upon their analyses (foresight retrospective).6
O v e r v i e w  o f  T o p i c s
The spectrum o f issues, geography and tim efram e spanned by the situa­
tions and developments addressed in the contributions is gratifyingly 
broad. Taken as a whole, they certainly comprise a representative cross­
section o f the research conducted at SWP. The contributions are presented 
in their (fictitious!) chronological order.
Racist police violence against black Americans and protests against it 
represent the background to the contribution by Johannes Thimm and 
Lars Brozus. They describe how a nation-wide escalation o f violence during 
a highly polarised 2016 presidential election campaign leads to a crisis of 
state.
Christian Becker, Hanns Günther Hilpert, Hanns W. Maull and Alexan­
dra Sakaki examine the repercussions o f a devastating earthquake striking 
Greater Tokyo in June 2016, including the geopolitical consequences for 
Sino-Japanese relations and Germany's options for a response.
In summer 2016 a Russian warplane with nuclear weapons on board 
crashes in Ukrainian territory. Could such an incident contribute to re­
viving cooperation between NATO and Russia? Oliver Meier and Marcel 
Dickow analyse the circumstances and responses that would require.
Remaining with Russia, Sabine Fischer, Margarete Klein and Alexander 
Libman consider potential trajectories o f autonomy endeavours arising in 
2017 in Russia's Far East. As well as the repercussions within Russia, they 
also consider the effects on Sino-Russian relations and on Germany and the 
European Union.
Bettina Rudloff and Nils Simon examine an often overlooked risk to the 
stability o f North Africa. They outline a situation where agricultural pro­
duction collapses because o f a sudden loss o f pollinators, and sketch out 
the consequences for the countries north o f the Mediterranean.
ments: Why We Can't Live without Them and How We Must Learn to Live with Them”, in 
Unmaking the West, ed. Tetlock, Lebow and Parker (see note 4), 14-44  (27).
6 This exercise helps to avoid analytical “tunnel vision”. Gary Saul Morson and Morton 
Schapiro, “Introduction: The Future of Prediction”, in The Fabulous Future? America and the 
World in 2040, ed. Gary Saul Morson and Morton Schapiro (Evanston, 2015), xv-xxix.
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M e t h o d
Alongside its conceptual design, the scholarly quality o f SWP foresight 
research is secured by a rigorous multi-stage selection and review pro­
cess^ The contributions were selected in a competitive forum. First o f 
all, short concept papers dealing with future questions o f relevance to 
international foreign and security policy were gathered from researchers 
across the institute. Three questions served as a rough guide: 1. What 
could happen? 2. Why could it happen? 3. W hat would this mean for 
Germany and the European Union? At a day-long workshop the fifteen 
submitted outlines were presented by their authors, commented on by 
a discussant and discussed in depth with SWP colleagues. Three criteria 
allowed for a comparative discussion: 1. consistency, 2. plausibility, 
3. originality and relevance.b The likelihood o f a scenario actually occur­
ring played no role in the assessm ent process.
The workshop concluded with an evaluation round, where points 
were awarded to each proposal. Here, again, the criteria were consist­
ency, plausibility, and originality and relevance. The seven proposals 
that received the highest scores were subsequently expanded into full- 
length drafts. The objective here was to use the methodologically guided 
combination o f critical analysis and creative imagination to arrive at 
plausible and convincing descriptions o f conceivable situations and 
developments. The drafts then passed through two rounds o f peer 
review and feedback.
a  Methodologically the preparation of a good foresight situation faces similar chal­
lenges to a counterfactual historical analysis. See Tetlock and Parker, “Counterfactual 
Thought Experiments” (see note 5).
b The individual assessment criteria were defined as follows: 1. Consistency relates 
to the structure of the argumentation. Are the ideas developed stringently? Is the 
described situation or development coherent? 2. Plausibility refers to the persuasive­
ness of the proposal, in the sense of whether the described situation could actually 
occur -  but not whether it in fact will. Is the narrative plausible? 3. The criterion of 
originality and relevance includes features such as drawing attention to significant 
developments that have to date been ignored (politically), and assessing which actors 
the situation is important for.
Steffen Angenendt, Anne Koch and Amrei Meier hypothesise that Germany 
and the European Union succeed in coping with Europe's biggest refugee 
crisis since the Second World War over the course o f the coming years. 
Looking back in 2020, they describe the measures and strategies that were 
required.
How should we imagine the process whereby the foreign ministries o f 
the EU member states are integrated into the European External Action 
Service? Ronja Kempin and Barbara Lippert investigate that question and 
describe -  from the perspective o f 2025 -  the associated opportunities and 
difficulties.
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Foresight retrospective: Dusan Reljic’s contribution about the “race” between 
nationalist and European ideas about integration in the Albanian-popu­
lated regions o f the Western Balkans occupies a special position. Here, the 
author critically re-examines his contribution for the 2011 Foresight 
Study.7
Such a review serves to test the validity o f one's own assumptions in the 
sense o f quality control. W hat is today's perspective on a scenario drafted 
several years ago? What were the key observations at that time? Where is 
there continuity today, where do the differences lie? Have new factors 
emerged? And have others receded? The fundamental trend turns out to be 
unchanged today, but the political, social and econom ic dynamics have 
sharpened.
C r i s i s  o f  S t a t e h o o d :  T e r r i t o r i a l i t y ,  P r o b l e m - s o l v i n g  C a p a c i t y  a n d  
N e w  O p t i o n s  f o r  A c t i o n
Reviewing the Foresight situations as a whole, one common feature stands 
out: all the contributions address challenges o f statehood occurring in dif­
ferent forms. On the one hand, this concerns the territoriality o f states, con­
cretely where existing borders are more or less explicitly called into ques­
tion. The situation Reljic describes in the Western Balkans arises when an 
Albanian popular m ovement unites territories divided by established 
borders. But the developments following an earthquake in Tokyo described 
by Becker and colleagues also include possible border changes in East Asia.
Secondly, the contributions contain very different types o f functional 
challenges to the problem-solving capacity o f states. This applies for ex­
ample to the national crisis in the United States described by Thimm and 
Brozus, where it proves impossible to resolve pathologies and dysfunction- 
alities in the police and justice system. Fischer and colleagues attribute the 
striving for autonomy in Russia's Far East partly to econom ic divergence 
between the European and Asian parts o f the country and Moscow's failure 
to compensate this. Finally, the North African food crisis described by Rud- 
lo ff and Simon is worsened by a political response that fails to take ad­
equate account o f looming supply risks. Neither the affected North African 
states nor the European Union have this challenge to food security properly 
“on their radar”.
Other contributions address specific answers to the challenges to estab­
lished statehood. Kempin and Lippert describe the transfer o f national for­
eign policy powers to the supranational EU level. Angenendt and col­
leagues sketch out the conditions under which a concerted national effort 
in Germany, backed up by a complementary EU policy, could be successful 
in addressing the refugee crisis. This includes reshaping the relationship 
between society and state and between national, state and local govern­
ment. Meier and Dickow, finally, examine the question o f w hether a Rus­
7 Dusan Reljic, “Border Changes on the Cards again in the Western Balkans”, in Expect the
Unexpected, ed. Perthes and Lippert (see note 3), 31-34.
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sian warplane carrying nuclear weapons crashing over Ukraine might poten­
tially persuade NATO and Russia to return to the path o f cooperation. In 
the scenario, Ukraine's inadequate problem-solving capacity is compen­
sated by a concerted cooperative effort by the m ajor powers.
It is no coincidence that the crisis o f statehood plays a role in all the con­
tributions. Both the comparatively stable OECD world and the more or less 
unstable states outside it find themselves facing sweeping challenges at a 
juncture where governance research indicates that states are increasingly 
transform ing from “monopolists o f power” to “managers o f political author­
ity”. 8 Especially under conditions o f fragile, unconsolidated statehood, it 
can be expected that this transform ation will continue to produce critical 
escalations whose repercussions pay no heed to existing borders.
8 Philipp Genschel and Bernhard Zangl, “Metamorphosen des Staates -  vom Herrschafts­
monopolisten zum Herrschaftsmanager”, Leviathan 36, no. 3 (2008): 4 3 0-54 ; Gunnar Folke 
Schuppert and Michael Zürn, eds., Governance in einer sich wandelnden Welt, special issue 41 
of Politische Vierteljahresschrif (PVS) (Wiesbaden, 2008); Wozu Staat? Governance in Räumen 
begrenzter und konsolidierter Staatlichkeit, ed. Marianne Beisheim, Tanja A. Börzel, Philipp 
Genschel, Bernhard Zangl (Baden-Baden, 2011); Governance without a State? Policies and 
Politics in Areas o f  Limited Statehood, ed. Thomas Risse (New York, 2011); The Oxford Handbook 
o f Transformation o f  the State, ed. Stephan Leibfried, Evelyn Huber, Matthew Lange, Jonah D. 
Levy, Frank Nullmeier and John D. Stephens (Oxford, 2015).
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Mississippi Blues: 
National Crisis in the United States
Johannes Thimm and Lars Brozus*
United States, a Friday evening at the end o f February 2016. A clip recorded 
in Meridian, Mississippi, spreads like wildfire on social media. It is difficult 
to recognise anything in the shaky video. A black youth is lying on the 
ground. A policeman presses a knee into the boy's back, shoving his face 
into the asphalt, while a colleague handcuffs him. Finally the dazed youth 
is pulled upright, pushed into a patrol car and driven away.
E r i n  a n d  K y le : O p p o s i n g  P e r s p e c t i v e s
Erin spends the entire night at her laptop. Her Twitter has been buzzing 
since news got out that the youth died in intensive care shortly after his 
arrest. Anderson Regional Medical Center refuses to com m ent on the cause 
o f death until an autopsy has been performed. But to Erin there is no 
doubt. Yet again police have killed an unarmed black person while making 
an arrest, and this time a minor. She is shocked but not surprised, given 
the wave o f reports o f police violence against black people since 2 0 1 4 .1
Erin attends the liberal Vassar College in New York. Most o f her fellow 
students come from wealthy families, although they do include members 
o f minorities. Few depend on student loans or grants, but the reports of 
those who do about their experiences growing up in areas where the 
police are seen as a threat deeply affect Erin.2 She wants W ashington to 
finally act to end the many forms o f discrimination that still exist.
At hom e in Fort Worth, Texas, Kyle is unsettled by the evening news. On 
Fox News Sean Hannity fumes about the reactions o f leading Democrats 
and civil rights activists to the events in Meridian. Hannity accuses them  of 
playing politics with tragedy by blaming the police. They could at least 
wait for the results o f the investigation, Kyle thinks, but no: whenever an 
unarmed non-white dies during an operation, the police involved are im­
mediately condemned as murderers. “Innocent until proven guilty” no 
longer seems to apply.
* The authors would like to thank Florian Gawehns for his assistance with the research 
for this contribution.
1 The killings of Eric Garner (17 July 2014, New York), Michael Brown (9 August 2014, 
Ferguson) and Freddie Gray (12 April 2015, Baltimore) drew international attention. On 
average in 2015 more than two people per day were shot dead by the police in the United 
States. Regularly updated overviews are published by the Washington Post and the Guard­
ian : http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings/ (accessed 13 Oc­
tober 2015) and www.theguardian.com/us-news/series/counted-us-police-killings (accessed 
23 September 2015).
2 “Stop and Frisk Policy: New York City Police Department”, New York Times, http:// 
tinyurl.com/83md7ln (accessed 23 September 2015).
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Kyle dislikes this trend. He knows how dangerous police work is, as his 
brother serves in the Texas police. Instead o f honouring this work, Obama's 
Department o f Justice launches one investigation after another into mu­
nicipalities that decide against prosecuting police involved in killings. More 
broadly, too, he believes, Washington has been interfering increasingly 
strongly in the states' affairs, seeking to dictate everything from same-sex 
marriage and the treatm ent o f illegal immigrants to gun laws, as well as 
w hether the police is representative enough. Kyle sees these as dangerous 
excesses on the road to tyranny. He no longer understands his country.
U n r e s t  i n  M i s s i s s i p p i :  W a s h i n g t o n  I n t e r v e n e s
More than one third o f the population o f Mississippi is black. To them , the 
latest incident is typical o f a long history o f brutality and injustice, suf­
fered at the hands o f an overwhelmingly white police and justice system. 
The Department o f Justice had already investigated the Meridian police for 
systematic civil rights violations in 2011/12, after black youths had been 
routinely arrested for m inor disciplinary infractions at school and held for 
days.3 Against this history, responses to the current case are angry. Protest 
rallies are held in Meridian and the state capital Jackson. Outside political 
activists, many o f them  veterans o f protests in New York, Ferguson and 
Baltimore, support the local organisers.4 They denounce the police vio­
lence that affects black people more than twice as frequently as other 
groups.5 With each incident they become more organised.
But not everyone is blaming the forces o f the state. Mississippi Governor 
Phil Bryant demonstratively backs the local police.6 After successive nights 
o f rioting and looting in Jackson he imposes a curfew enforced by a mas­
sive police presence. Bryant also rejects President Obama's criticism o f the 
actions o f the local police and condemns any outside interference. For this, 
he can count on the support o f Mississippi's overwhelmingly conservative 
white population, where mistrust o f Obama is widespread.7
3 “Justice Department Releases Investigative Findings Showing Constitutional Rights of 
Children in Mississippi Being Violated”, The United States Department o f  Justice, Office o f Public 
Affairs (online), 10 August 2012, http://1.usa.gov/1FBnguL (accessed 23 September 2015).
4 Steven Hsieh and Raven Rakia, “After #Ferguson: The Protests that Followed the Police 
Shooting of Michael Brown Created a Network of Youth in Revolt”, The Nation, 27 October
2014, 18-21.
5 The relative proportion of unarmed black people killed by police, compared to white, is 
even higher, Guardian (see note 1).
6 Bryant is one of the most conservative state governors, cf. Nate Silver, “In State Govern­
ments, Signs of a Healthier G.O.P.”, New York Times (online), 16 April 2013, http://nyti.ms/ 
1V6HfHR. He is a sharp critic of Obama; see for example his “Letter to President Obama” 
of 18 July 2014, http://www.governorbryant.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Letter-to- 
President-Obama-Concerning-Illegal-Immigration.pdf, and Shushannah Walshe, “Several 
State Legislators Say No to Federal Gun Control Laws”, abcNews (online), 17 January 2013, 
http://tinyurl.com/bcqwgjv (accessed 15 October 2015). In early 2013 Bryant called on the 
Mississippi State Legislature to outlaw any unconstitutional Presidential order tightening 
gun controls, http://twitpic.com/bvq96z (accessed 15 October 2015).
7 Almost 49 percent of those polled by Gallup in Mississippi in 2014 described their po-
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After a second death at a protest rally in Jackson, Washington decides to 
intervene directly to prevent a nation-wide escalation. Obama makes a 
statem ent expressing his concern about the collapse o f law and order in 
Mississippi and orders the deployment o f the National Guard.8 President 
Kennedy's response in 1962 to the rioting over desegregation at University 
o f Mississippi is used as a precedent.9
Governor Bryant is not prepared to accept this, and accuses Obama of 
violating the constitution.10 The governors o f Texas, Alabama and Tennes­
see declare their solidarity with Bryant. Mississippi's Republican-controlled 
State Legislature passes a resolution denying all and any state support for 
presidential decrees not authorised by the US Congress.11 Some members 
o f the National Guard refuse to follow orders, while Mississippi's police 
cannot agree which side to serve. Secretary o f Defense Ashton Carter 
suggests to Obama that he consider deploying regular army units.
E s c a l a t i o n  i n  P r i m a r y  S e a s o n
While one half o f the country sees the demonstrations as a legitimate pro­
test against racism and police brutality, the other half has no patience 
with the daily demonstrations, which frequently end in violent clashes. 
The events dominate the Republican primaries for the 2016 presidential 
election, many o f which are held on March 1. The candidates vie to slam 
Obama's handling o f the crisis. Jeb Bush accuses the incum bent o f weak­
ness. Ted Cruz complains that the President had trampled on states' rights 
and encouraged the “anarchists” on the streets. Donald Trump draws atten­
tion with racist comments. W hat “Super Tuesday” does not bring about is 
a decision about who will be the Republican presidential candidate.
The protests spread during the following weeks. And they are no longer 
directed only against police violence. The people on the streets now begin
litical views as conservative, the highest figure in the United States, cf. http://tinyurl. 
com/6uas895. In 2012 more than half of Republican voters in Mississippi believed that 
Barack Obama was a Muslim, cf. David Meeks, “Poll: Obama's a Muslim to Many GOP 
Voters in Alabama, Mississippi”, Los Angeles Times (online), 12 March 2012, http://tinyurl. 
com/855hmst (all accessed 15 October 2015).
8 Under Title 10 (“Armed Forces”) §12406 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), the President 
may call state National Guard forces into federal service, http://1.usa.gov/1MrGmlE 
(accessed 15 October 2015).
9 In 1962, following unrest over the enrollment of the first black student at the Uni­
versity of Mississippi, President Kennedy placed the National Guard under federal com­
mand and deployed the Army to ensure the enrollment could take place, cf. http:// micro- 
sites.jfklibrary.org/olemiss/home (accessed 23 September 2015).
10 The Mississippi State Legislature protested in 1962 against the “invasion of the sover­
eign State of Mississippi” by federal forces and the placing of the National Guard under 
federal command. That argument is revived here. See http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/ 
olemiss/aftermath/doc1.html (accessed 23 September 2015).
11 Arizona's House of Representatives passed a similar resolution in 2015, which was ad­
journed indefinitely in the Senate: Arizona House Bill 2368, 17 March 2015, and Colbert I. 
King, “Encouraging a Rebellion against Obama”, Washington Post, 5 April 2015, A17.
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C o n d i t i o n s  o f  E s c a l a t i o n
Structural discrimination o f minorities by the police and justice sys­
tem and econom ic inequalities originating in the segregation era con­
tinue to be felt in the United States today .a The income gap between 
black and white has scarcely narrowed since the end o f the 1960s.b But 
today there is a great deal more scientific data and publicly accessible 
inform ation about these injustices.c The ubiquity o f cameras and social 
media allows police violence to be documented and publicised as never 
before, while a fundamental diversification o f inform ation sources in 
the internet age amplifies the fragmentation o f perspectives and opin­
ions. Radical views become entrenched in “islands o f perception” with 
little exchange between different world views. Instead o f profiting 
from debate, citizens seek out news sources that confirm their existing 
ideas. Partially as a result o f this development, ideological and partisan 
polarisation in the United States is more pronounced than at any time 
since 1945.d Exacerbating the polarisation, part o f the white electorate 
perceives the demographic and social changes -  as reflected in a rising 
non-white proportion o f the US population and a liberalisation o f social 
values -  as a threat.e The interaction between these trends leads to an 
erosion o f the fundamental social consensus. Willingness to work to­
gether across party lines, which is essential in the strongly compromise- 
based US political system, is at a historic low.
While the expectation that the government will tackle injustices has 
grown, its possibilities to im plement far-reaching reforms have shrunk. 
This discrepancy between expectation and reality particularly affects 
the Obama Administration, which had generated great expectations o f 
reducing structural political, social and economic asymmetries. Dis­
appointment with the lack o f positive change can be a significant driver 
o f social unrest, even in consolidated democracies.
a Ta-Nehisi Coates, “The Case for Reparations”, The Atlantic, June 2014, http://www. 
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631 (accessed 
23 September 2015).
b Michael A. Fletcher, “Fifty Years after March on Washington, Economic Gap be­
tween Blacks, Whites Persists”, Washington Post, 28 August 2013, http://wapo.st/ 
17hLgAz (accessed 23 September 2015).
c Jill Lepore, “Richer and Poorer: Accounting for Inequality”, New Yorker, 16 March 
2015, http://tinyurl.com/maq4o4s, and John Cassidy, “Is America an Oligarchy?”, New 
Yorker, 18 April 2014, http://tinyurl.com/mlnaou8 (both accessed 23 September 2015). 
d Matthew Yglesias, “American Democracy Is Doomed”, Vox, 8 October 2015, http:// 
tinyurl.com/p49bf7f (accessed 16 October 2015).
e Matthew W. Hughey, “White Backlash in the ‘Post-racial' United States”, Ethnic and 
Racial Studies Review 37, no. 5 (2014): 721-30.
SWP Berlin
Foresight 2015
January 2016
14
Johannes Thimm and Lars Brozus
raising general political demands, above all for a reduction in econom ic in­
equality. After shootings occur at demonstrations in Detroit, Jackson, 
St. Louis and Los Angeles, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch warns o f anar­
chy. Finally, the Mississippi primary scheduled for 8 March is cancelled, 
because public security can no longer be ensured. Obama orders in the 
Army.12
The opposition in Congress rages. The Republicans stand united behind 
the state government o f Mississippi. Supporters o f the Tea Party accuse the 
President o f violating the constitution. They apply for an emergency hear­
ing before the Supreme Court and prepare to impeach Obama. Conserva­
tive media rally to their cause, in uproar over the Administration's actions. 
The gun lobby's long-standing accusations that the President is seeking to 
undermine the Second Amendment boosts conspiracy theories.13 The FBI 
reports increased activity among right-wing militias and armed groups 
that regard themselves as the guardians o f liberty against central govern­
m ent's tyranny.14 Finally, national politics grinds to a complete halt. 
While the army occupies strategically im portant points in Mississippi, the 
country spirals into a grave crisis o f state.15
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  R e a c t i o n s
The events in the US reverberate globally. Across the world news channels 
report the crisis round the clock. Russia advises W ashington to concen­
trate on resolving its domestic problems rather than playing the global 
policeman. Egypt and Turkey call for the dem onstrators' human rights to 
be respected. W ashington's allies wonder how effectively the United States 
can still fulfil its role as guarantor o f security under these circumstances. 
With the attention o f the political leadership in W ashington completely 
absorbed by domestic unrest, fear o f provocations grows in crisis regions 
around the globe. While some fear foreign policy paralysis, others worry 
that W ashington could be tempted to pursue military adventure abroad to 
distract from  domestic political problems.
12 Here again, Kennedy is Obama's model, in particular Executive Order 11053 of 30 Sep­
tember 1962 on the basis of U.S.C. Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 15: Insurrection. 
The Order cites “Assistance for Removal of Unlawful Obstructions of Justice” as grounds 
for deploying federal forces in the state of Mississippi, cf. http://1.usa.gov/1LPJNIh (ac­
cessed 15 October 2015).
13 Clyde Haberman, “Memories of Waco Siege Continue to Fuel Far-Right Groups”, New 
York Times, 12 July 2015, http://nyti.ms/1Hpb1jF (accessed 23 September 2015).
14 Adam Nagourney, “A Defiant Rancher Savors the Audience That Rallied to His Side”, 
New York Times, 23 April 2014, A1, http://nyti.ms/1fs2xIO, and Charles Kurzman and David 
Schanzer, “The Growing Right-Wing Terror Threat”, New York Times, 16 June 2015, A27, 
http://nyti.ms/1MHqhcP (both accessed 15 October 2015).
15 The scenario of an uprising by armed right-wing militias against central government 
is discussed by Kevin Benson and Jennifer Weber in “Full Spectrum Operations in the 
Homeland: A ‘Vision' of the Future”, Small Wars Journal 8, no. 7 (25 July 2012), http:// 
tinyurl.com/pegmjje (accessed 23 September 2015).
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Many Europeans are shocked by the escalation in the United States and 
wonder whether similar events could occur in their continent. Debates 
about the decline o f the United States and the repercussions o f its turn 
away from Europe are not new, but now they acquire an added urgency. 
Those arguing for a more independent and self-reliant European Union 
feel vindicated. Their argument that it is high time to reduce political, eco­
nom ic and social inequalities to prevent the disintegration o f the Union is 
supported by more and more people.
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Asia-Pacific:
Earthquake Shatters Geopolitical Balance
Christian Becker, Hanns Günther Hilpert, Hanns W. Maull and Alexandra Sakaki
Around noon on 17 June 2016, Tokyo is hit by an earthquake measuring 
7.3 on the Richter scale. The immediate consequences are devastating: 
15,000 are killed immediately and many buildings collapse or burn 
(despite strict building standards), blocking roads and hampering rescue 
efforts. If that were not enough, Beijing senses an opportunity to take a 
decisive step towards its objective o f dominance in Asia and to create facts 
on the ground in its territorial conflict with Japan over the Senkaku 
islands (Chinese: Diaoyu). Germany and Europe come under pressure to 
adopt a position on the conflict.
The disaster does not come out o f the blue. In 2012, Japanese experts put 
the probability o f a quake o f 7.0 or higher at up to 70 percent by 2016 and 
up to 98 percent by 2 041 .1 In the days after the disaster the government 
appears paralysed, barely able to function with communication channels 
broken and m ajor government buildings unusable. Although the govern­
m ent possesses an alternative centre at the Tachikawa Disaster-Prepared- 
ness Base thirty kilometres west o f Tokyo, this is also damaged and initially 
not functional. The yen comes under massive pressure, despite the repat­
riation o f Japanese foreign assets. The Fed, the European Central Bank and 
other central banks intervene to help, with mixed results. Facing enor­
mous and initially unquantifiable reconstruction costs on top o f already 
excessive public debt, interest rates spike; the state faces insolvency. The 
international stock and finance markets are increasingly nervous.
As after the last two m ajor quakes in 1995 and 2011, Japan experiences a 
wave o f help and solidarity. Thousands o f citizens from  across the country 
join  the rescue and clearance efforts. The United States announces it is mo­
bilising 24,000 soldiers for disaster relief. But soon harsh criticism is also 
heard: after the last two m ajor quakes, the Japanese government should 
have worked much harder to enforce stricter building rules and implement 
preventive measures. The government itself appears shaken and paralysed, 
with recurring outbursts o f nationalist anger from  certain quarters and 
attempts to shift the blame for the consequences o f the quake.
C h i n a ’ s  D u p l i c i t y
Mere hours after the tectonic disaster, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
declares his deep sympathy and offers Japan massive support for national 
reconstruction using funds from the new Asian Infrastructure Investment
1 Elizabeth Yuan, “Tokyo Sees High Quake Probability, Scientists W arn”, CNN, 27 January
2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/24/world/asia/tokyo-quake-forecast (accessed 23 Sep­
tember 2015).
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Bank (AIIB) and loans from the Chinese state. However, currency traders in 
Hong Kong report large-scale selling o f Japanese bonds on behalf o f un­
named Chinese institutions. Even more unsettling is the growing number 
o f Chinese fishing vessels entering Japan’s contested territorial waters 
around the Senkaku islands.2 Some even land on the islands, ostensibly 
because o f mechanical difficulties or medical emergencies. Chinese crew 
members detained on land by Japanese security forces are freed by their 
colleagues, while a nearby Chinese coastguard vessel warns the Japanese 
against taking action against the fisherm en. The Japanese radar station on 
Yonaguni island, 150 kilometres south o f the Senkaku group, reports 
Chinese warplanes close to the islands’ airspace. Footage showing scuffles 
between Japanese security forces and Chinese fisherm en appears in Chi­
nese social networks and on Twitter. After these incidents Tokyo is afraid 
to take any further action. The Chinese make themselves at hom e in the 
islands and exercise passive resistance. A stalemate emerges. Government 
figures in Tokyo say they suspect these are not fisherm en, but Chinese 
special forces in disguise.
In the meantime, progress on restoring the Japanese telecommunica­
tions infrastructure is slow. Even after m akeshift repairs, significant nodes 
are not operating as reliably as hoped. US cyber-experts suspect the 
reduced performance o f electronic networks to be a result o f coordinated 
cyber-attacks, whose trail supposedly leads directly to the People’s Repub­
lic o f China. They believe the Chinese want to exploit the physical destruc­
tion to delay Japan’s recovery and lever greater opportunity for a power 
shift in the region. Beijing angrily dismisses such accusations and counters 
that China had offered the Japanese people substantial disaster relief.
R e a c t i o n s  f r o m  t h e  A s i a - P a c i f i c  R e g i o n
The described events presage a massive shift in strategic power in East Asia. 
W ashington believes that Beijing is exploiting the opportunity to reshape 
the regional order in its favour and pursuing asymmetrical strategies to 
gain control over the contested Senkaku islands. Washington also doubts 
Tokyo’s resolve to stand up to the Chinese incursions.
Although certain South-East Asian states are alarmed, as are Australia 
and India, there are signs that even they may be able to come to an 
arrangem ent with the emerging geopolitical shift. Russia stresses how 
important it is to resolve the dispute “bilaterally” and without “external 
interference”; in view o f Japan ’s limited options this stance is tantam ount 
to taking sides with China. Even in the United States many voices warn 
against opposing Beijing too energetically. With smooth cooperation
2 On the conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands see Nadine Godehardt, Alexandra 
Sakaki and Gudrun Wacker, “Sino-japanischer Inselstreit und europäische Beiträge zur 
Deeskalation”, in Ungeplant bleibt der Normalfall: Acht Situationen, die politische Aufmerksamkeit 
verdienen, ed. Volker Perthes and Barbara Lippert, SWP-Studie 16/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2013), 24-28 , http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/ 
contents/products/studien/2013_S16_prt_lpt.pdf (accessed 9 October 2015).
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essential to stabilise the international currency and financial markets, 
they say, the good relationship with the Chinese central bank should not 
be risked lightly. On the other hand, the Republican presidential candidate 
takes a harder line on the campaign trail. America must unequivocally 
condemn the Chinese attacks, he says, and stand by its ally Japan in this 
difficult situation. In response a US government spokesperson announces 
that Beijing’s double game is unacceptable and that W ashington is con­
sidering sanctions. At the same time Obama is desperately trying to inte­
grate China into multilateral efforts to deal with the symptoms o f an in­
cipient global econom ic crisis. W ashington therefore seeks allies that can 
exert a moderating influence on Beijing and encourage it to compromise.
O p t i o n s  f o r  G e r m a n y
The German government finds itself in a complicated situation. It believes 
that China is indeed seeking to unilaterally alter the status quo in East 
Asia, which would further undermine an international order already frac­
tured by the Ukraine conflict. But German observers cannot agree whether 
Beijing has correctly assessed the risks o f its policy -  or is instead looking 
for face-saving opportunities to beat a retreat. Washington presses for 
European support and expects Germany to take a leading role. At the same 
time many in Berlin worry about the good relationship with China, in 
which many years o f work have been invested, and fear econom ic costs if 
relations were to deteriorate.
Berlin has three obvious options in this situation. Firstly, to continue its 
existing policy o f seeking as far as possible to keep out o f the territorial 
conflict; secondly, a hard line based on the conviction that China’s actions 
strongly endanger the regional and international order; and thirdly, a 
middle line o f sanction-backed dialogue.
Continuing the existing policy is likely not only to harm relations with 
Japan and the United States. It would also contradict the fundamental Ger­
man interest in a functioning international order. It is questionable 
w hether Beijing would reward such a policy o f appeasement, whose con­
sequence could be to lastingly weaken Germany’s standing in China. If, on 
the other hand, Berlin pursued a hard line, German businesses would have 
to expect losses. This option might also make it difficult for Beijing to find 
face-saving compromises, and thus in fact further escalate the crisis.
These considerations mitigate for a sanction-backed dialogue. Berlin’s 
premise would be that changing the status quo -  de facto Japanese control 
over islands whose status under international law remains unclarified -  by 
use o f force is not acceptable. Berlin would also propose econom ic sanc­
tions in the event o f the Chinese fisherm en refusing to leave the islands. 
Sanctions could include restrictions on Chinese investments in Germany 
and on German technology exports to China. At the same time German di­
plomacy would seek to mobilise the broadest possible international sup­
port for this position, working to cooperate above all with states in the
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region (like Australia and ASEAN states) that are also affected by the Chi­
nese actions and favour a similar response.
P r e v e n t i v e  M e a s u r e s
What could and should Berlin do to avoid the political dangers o f this sce­
nario coming about? Effective preventive measures would have to be ini­
tiated by the affected states themselves. Germany has only limited scope to 
influence the three m ost im portant participants, China, Japan and the 
United States. Nonetheless, Berlin can and should work above all to per­
suade Tokyo and Beijing to defuse the territorial conflict and adopt con­
fidence-building measures. To this end, for example, the Sino-Japanese agree­
ments o f 2008, which provide for jo in t exploitation o f oil and gas reserves 
in parts o f the East China Sea, could be revived. International observer 
groups could m onitor implementation and ensure transparency. In these 
contexts Germany could offer its good services and contribute European 
experience. Here too, Berlin should pursue a twin-track approach, seeking 
bilateral talks and working towards jo in t positions and initiatives within 
the European Union while at the same time exploring opportunities to 
form coalitions with other states in the region and in multilateral contexts 
like the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).
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Danger of Nuclear Accidents
Oliver Meier and Marcel Dickow
In July 2016 a Russian Tupolev Tu-22M3 intermedium-range bomber crashes 
over eastern Ukraine. It was apparently en route to the Crimean Peninsula 
from the Russian air base and nuclear weapons storage site Belgorod-22.1 
After a catastrophic engine failure close to the Russian-Ukrainian border, 
the je t crashes inside Ukraine. The three Russian crew members die.
Ukrainian armed forces secure the crash site about ten kilometres from 
the Russian border, not far from  the Ukrainian city o f Kharkiv. They meas­
ure increased levels o f radioactivity. Soon, four tactical nuclear warheads 
are found close to the crash site. All are damaged, and the conventional 
detonator o f one has exploded, fortunately without initiating a chain re­
action. However, the explosion has dispersed fissile material. Kiev passes 
the inform ation to Washington, which informs its NATO allies under 
strictest confidentiality.
Given the risk o f a nuclear explosion, Kiev requests US nuclear experts 
to secure and recover the warheads. Members o f the elite Delta Force, 
which is responsible for salvaging damaged nuclear weapons, seal o ff the 
crash site. The US specialists succeed in securing the three less seriously 
damaged warheads, so that it would in principle be possible to transport 
them. But they advise involving Russian special forces to help with secur­
ing the fourth warhead and decontaminating the site.
P o t e n t i a l  f o r  E s c a l a t i o n
In reacting to the incident, the Kremlin initially merely states that a Rus­
sian bom ber has experienced technical difficulties over Russian territory 
and has crashed inside Ukraine. Moscow demands the immediate repatria­
tion o f the remains o f the crew and unhindered access to the crash site “to 
secure and recover Russian property”. Since Russia remains silent on the 
nuclear dimension, the United States, France and Germany deliver a jo int 
demarche, demanding clarity. But even in a confidential setting, the Krem­
lin refuses to provide inform ation about the nuclear weapons involved.
At the same time, NATO observes special forces gathering on the Russian 
side o f the border. It is feared that Russia intends to seize the warheads by 
force. For any state that possesses nuclear weapons, losing control o f a war­
head represents a worst-case scenario. Nuclear weapon designs are among
1 On the background to a possible stationing of nuclear weapons in Crimea, see for 
example Hans Kristensen, “Rumors about Nuclear Weapons in Crimea”, Federation of 
American Scientists (FAS), FAS Strategic Security Blog, 18 December 2014, https://fas.org/ 
blogs/security/2014/12/crimea (accessed 23 September 2015).
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the m ost closely guarded national secrets, and loss o f such information 
must be prevented at almost any price.2
Two days later, Ukrainian media report that the crashed plane might 
have had nuclear weapons on board. Journalists observe US special forces 
and nuclear weapons experts in the vicinity o f the crash site. Independent 
sources soon confirm increased radiation levels, at distances o f up to five 
kilometres from the crash site.
With the nuclear dimension no longer deniable, Moscow goes on the 
offensive. The Russian government announces that four tactical nuclear 
warheads had been on board the bomber, which had been part o f a squad­
ron o f nuclear-armed Tu-22M3s stationed in Crimea. The Kremlin also 
states that it had deployed nuclear warheads for Iskander short-range 
missiles to Crimea m onths earlier. The Russian foreign minister says it is 
“the right o f every sovereign nuclear weapon state to station nuclear weap­
ons on any part o f its territory”.3 While Russia, he says, “bases its nuclear 
weapons only within its own territory”, the United States continued to 
“deploy nuclear weapons on the territory o f non-nuclear-weapon states 
under NATO nuclear sharing”. Moscow protests against the presence of “US 
armed forces” close to its border and demands immediate unhindered 
access to recover its warheads.
Russia implicitly threatens to recover and return the weapons by use of 
force. Its foreign m inister publicly declares that “no nuclear-weapon state 
would, under any circumstances, permit another state to gain control over 
its nuclear weapons. Such a step would have the gravest consequences for 
international stability and security.” The longer Kiev and W ashington deny 
access, he says, “the greater the danger o f a catastrophe”.
After the speech, Western intelligence services report indications o f Rus­
sia raising the alert level o f its strategic nuclear forces. Simultaneously 
Russia conducts a snap exercise involving nuclear weapons deployed in 
Siberia. NATO believes that Moscow is signalling its readiness to use mili­
tary force in order to prevent removal o f the warheads from Ukraine. The 
Alliance now discusses w hether it should also deploy nuclear-capable deliv­
ery systems to demonstrate its readiness to escalate. The United States then 
indeed deploys nuclear-capable B-52 long-range bombers to the United King­
dom and Turkey. Several US warships, including two cruisers equipped 
with the Aegis missile defence system, are sent to the Black Sea for ma­
noeuvres.
2 “Physical security safeguards required to prevent unauthorized access to classified 
information and proper control and disposition of classified material must be strictly en­
forced during all operations involving the weapon(s) or weapon components”. “Nuclear 
Weapon Accident Response Procedures” (NARP), U.S. Department of Defense, Manual 
Number 3150.08, 22 August 2013, 43, 65, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/ 
315008m.pdf (accessed 23 September 2015).
3 For similar statements, see: “Crimea Became Part of Russia, Which Has Nuclear Weap­
ons According to NPT -  Lavrov”, Interfax -  Ukraine, 15 December 2014, http://en.interfax. 
com.ua/news/general/239978.html (accessed 23 September 2015).
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T h e  I n t e r e s t s  I n v o l v e d
All actors involved share an interest in having the damaged warhead 
removed safely, and in dealing with the radiological consequences o f the 
accident. Beyond these immediate goals, however, their interests diverge.
Ukraine wants to leverage the crisis to extract concessions from Russia. 
It condemns Moscow for sending a nuclear-armed Russian aircraft over 
Ukrainian territory and rejects the Russian request to send special forces to 
the crash site. Instead, Kiev requests a special session o f the UN Security 
Council to discuss the incident. The Ukrainian President declares: “More 
than twenty years ago, we voluntarily renounced our nuclear weapons and 
transported them  to Russia for dismantlement. In return, in the 1994 
Budapest Memorandum, Moscow promised to respect the territorial integ­
rity o f Ukraine. Now, Moscow deploys nuclear weapons on our territory, 
threatens us with the use o f such weapons, and endangers the safety o f the 
citizens o f Kharkiv and the entire region.”
The Ukrainian President demands that Russia end its “occupation” of 
Crimea, and calls for the international community's support “against Rus­
sian aggression”. The Russian nuclear weapons will not be returned, he 
says, until Russia withdraws completely from Ukraine, including Crimea. 
Behind the scenes, Ukraine demands more specific concessions: Russia 
should immediately and visibly end its support for the “rebels” in eastern 
Ukraine and pay compensation o f $5 billion for the environmental 
damage resulting from the crash. Only under these conditions, it indicates, 
would it grant access to the crash site and permit the warheads' removal 
to Russia. As a sign o f goodwill, Ukraine returns the bodies o f the three 
Russian crew members.
The United States wishes to exploit the incident to its own diplomatic 
advantage. US experts also want to be present when the warheads are dis­
armed in order to gain knowledge about the Russian nuclear weapons 
technology. Washington condemns Russia for the overflight and calls on 
Moscow to cooperate in recovering the weapons under Ukrainian and US 
oversight. Washington also joins Kiev in demanding an immediate end of 
Russian support for the “rebels” in eastern Ukraine, and insists that Russia 
officially promises never to store or deploy nuclear weapons on Ukrainian 
territory (including Crimea). W ashington is implicitly threatening to trans­
port the three undamaged Russian warheads to the United States.
Russia wants to re-establish control over the weapons as quickly as 
possible, and at all costs want to prevent them  falling into American 
hands. Yet, a cross-border military recovery operation appears risky to the 
Kremlin. Not only could the United States pre-empt such a move by remov­
ing the warheads. Moscow also fears that an incursion bears a high risk of 
a direct military confrontation between the United States and Russia.
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C o n f l i c t  a s  a n  O p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  C o o p e r a t i o n
In such a situation, Germany can seek to initiate the search for a coopera­
tive solution. Berlin could -  possibly in concert with other states and in co­
ordination with the United States -  propose a compromise as a way out o f 
the confrontation. The basis for an initiative would be the shared interest 
in safe removal o f the weapons.
Such a solution could include arrangements for Russian special forces to 
be given controlled access to the crash site. Russian specialists would 
secure and then remove the four warheads, without the United States or 
other states directly observing the action on the ground. In this scenario, 
military observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) could fulfil the role o f neutral monitors, while German 
experts would assist with radiation m onitoring and decontamination.
In return, Russia would agree to cover decontamination costs o f up to $1 
billion. NATO and Russia jointly promise not to store or deploy nuclear 
weapons on the territory o f third states, absent the consent o f the host 
nation. A confidential additional protocol to the agreement would clarify 
that Moscow will not store or station nuclear weapons on Ukrainian terri­
tory, including Crimea.
On German initiative, NATO and Russia also agree to conduct jo in t semi­
nars and exercises, which would focus on how to avoid similar incidents in 
future, as well as cooperative consequence management. Berlin hopes that 
this could initiate a process o f confidence-building between NATO and 
Russia and help to reopen channels o f communication that were closed as 
a result o f the Ukraine conflict. After signing the agreement at the Federal 
Foreign Ministry's lakeside guesthouse in Berlin-Tegel, the German foreign 
m inister declares:
Just as the Cuba crisis in 1962 was a wake-up call to remind us that 
nuclear weapons present an incalculable risk, especially in times of 
crisis, this unfortunate incident has left us in no doubt about how 
quickly a crisis can spiral out o f control. In the 1960s, the Cuba crisis 
ushered in a phase o f arms control that laid the basis for overcoming 
the political confrontation between East and West. The Kharkiv crisis 
reminds us again how -  especially in the nuclear field -  transparency 
and cooperation now are more im portant than ever. Such cooperation is 
essential not despite the conflict between NATO and Russia but precisely 
because of it.
Berlin points out that its confidence-building proposal could be seen as a 
continuation o f the jo in t exercises on handling nuclear accidents and 
incidents conducted under the auspices o f the NATO-Russia Council 
between 2004 and 2 007 .4
4 See for example Katarzyna Kubiak, NATO and Russia Experiences with Nuclear Transparency 
and Confidence-building Measures, background paper for the workshop “Non-Strategic Nu­
clear Weapons in Europe: Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Practice”
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R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  P r e v e n t i v e  M e a s u r e s
Germany should be prepared that the nuclear dimension o f the Ukraine 
crisis, to which Russia has contributed through to its own actions, makes 
an unintended escalation o f the conflict more likely. This could occur, for 
example, following an accident involving nuclear weapons and/or nuclear- 
capable delivery systems. An exercise involving nuclear assets, or a Russian 
commander with control over nuclear weapons “going rogue”, could also 
initiate an escalation unintended by political or military leaders. Nuclear 
accidents and incidents not only involve the danger o f release o f radio­
activity or even nuclear explosion.5 Consequence managem ent also con­
tains political risks that could potentially cause the situation to escalate 
further. On the other hand, as history shows, nuclear crises can increase 
awareness o f the need for cooperation precisely because so much is at stake.
NATO should therefore do everything it can to work jointly with Russia 
to prevent any unintended nuclear escalation o f the Ukraine crisis. Vis-a-vis 
Russia, the Alliance should:
► continue to propose improvements in crisis communication, building 
on previous German efforts within NATO;
► offer to resume practical cooperation to prevent nuclear accidents and 
incidents;
► in this context also press to update, strengthen and expand existing bi­
lateral mechanisms between Russia and the United States for avoiding 
incidents (for example the Incidents at Sea Agreement and the Agree­
m ent on the Prevention o f Dangerous Military Activities). The potential 
benefits o f opening these bilateral arrangements to other NATO states 
should be considered;
► push for better cooperation in consequence management o f intended or 
unintended use o f nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Should such 
cooperation prove to be too difficult in the NATO-Russia Council, other 
institutional frameworks, such as the OSCE or UN Security Council Reso­
lution 1540 on non-proliferation o f weapons o f mass destruction, could 
be used.
(Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 27 and 28 March 2013), http://www.swp-berlin. 
org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/wp_kubiak_April2014.pdf (accessed 24 
September 2015).
5 Oliver Meier, Die nukleare Dimension der Ukraine-Krise, SWP-Aktuell 66/2014 (Berlin: Stif­
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2014), http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/ 
contents/ products/aktuell/2014A66_mro.pdf (accessed 24 September 2015).
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Before the 2018 Presidential Election: 
Autonomy Conflict in Russia’s Far East
Sabine Fischer, Margarete Klein and Alexander Libman
In October 2017 the governors o f the Primorye, Amur and Khabarovsk 
regions in Russia's Far East (see Map, p. 27) demand far-reaching foreign 
policy and trade autonomy.1 They want to establish a special economic 
zone to permit the three regions, which lie along the Silk Road Economic 
Belt, to connect more closely with China -  independently o f Moscow. 
Shortly beforehand, the Eurasian Economic Commission had decided to 
impose a prohibitive tariff on Chinese textiles and drastically intensify 
customs controls to clamp down on illegal imports. This move originated 
in pressure from Moscow, and represents a m ajor threat to the three 
border regions, because it obstructs trade with neighbouring Chinese 
regions. That in turn undermines the income streams o f regional political 
actors, high-ranking bureaucrats and businesses associated with them, 
which have in recent years invested massively in expanding the infrastruc­
ture for cross-border trade, including bridges, transport links and logistics 
centres. The foreseeable end o f the flow o f goods from China will make 
these investments literally worthless. The socio-economic status quo in the 
region is also at risk, threatening to generate popular protests and create 
political instability.
The Kremlin responds with an iron fist. The three governors are dis­
missed and replaced with long-serving senior security officials sent from 
Moscow. But they must yet win the regional elections, scheduled for Sep­
tem ber 2018. The bosses o f state-owned and partly state-owned businesses 
in the regions are replaced. By these actions the centre hopes to stamp any 
inkling o f a precedent for moves towards regional autonomy.
Conflicts ensue both between different camps within the affected re­
gional elites, and between these elites and representatives o f individual 
federal power centres, especially the presidential administration, which 
plays a prom inent role in appointments at governor level. The dismissed 
governors announce they will be standing in the 2018 regional elections. 
The presidential administration sees this as the emergence o f a potentially 
dangerous opposition and launches a campaign to discredit its opponents. 
Federal and regional television stations accuse the form er governors o f 
rampant corruption. The Moscow-loyal interim governors attempt to or­
ganise demonstrations against their predecessors, but are blocked by resist­
ance within the regional administrations. Some o f the regional television 
stations participate only unwillingly in the defamation campaign, and 
even permit the dismissed governors and their supporters to appear in their
1 The executive heads of the constituent territories of the Russian Federation have a
range of titles. For the sake of clarity, in the following -  as in the Russian and Western
academic discourse -  the term “governor” is used for all of them.
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programmes. Opinion polls show that Moscow's measures are having prac­
tically no effect. It transpires that the events in the Far East massively 
endanger the stability o f the Russian political system -  shortly before the 
March 2018 presidential election, for which Vladimir Putin announced his 
renewed candidacy in September 2017.
The crisis acquires a cross-border dimension rapidly and rather acci­
dentally, after the Russian authorities expand the clampdown to include 
Chinese businesses associated with the three renegade governors. Chinese 
export companies operating in the three regions are subjected to surprise 
audits, blocking their business for weeks. One Chinese businessman is even 
detained for three days. The government o f Heilongjiang province protests 
vociferously against these practices. Beijing does not explicitly adopt a 
stance, but does not seek moderation either. This feeds Russian suspicions 
that China hopes to exploit the conflict for its own econom ic interests.
C o n d i t i o n s  a n d  I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  R u s s i a n  D o m e s t i c  a n d  
F o r e i g n  P o l i c y
Central control over regional politicians and bureaucrats is one o f the 
most important pillars o f the Russian regime. Fear o f national disintegra­
tion is widespread not only among Russia's leaders, but also within the 
population. Even limited autonomy is often regarded as a first step in this 
direction. The principal task o f the governors in Putin's power vertical is to 
ensure their regions deliver the results the centre wishes in federal elec­
tions. Overwhelming majorities are imperative to demonstrate the politi­
cal leadership's grip on power. The smallest deviation is interpreted as an 
affront to Moscow, and undermining the system. This lends the conflict 
between the Kremlin and the sacked governors o f Khabarovsk, Amur and 
Primorye far-reaching implications for the stability o f the Russian regime. 
This is also the reason for the centre's over-reaction to the initiative of 
three governors: it is determined to stamp out the spark before flames can 
spread. Moscow also fears bandwagon effects in other regions, above all 
Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, which could also seek a special economic 
status o f their own. Elsewhere, the regime-critical civil society in Moscow, 
St. Petersburg and regional centres like Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk and Kali­
ningrad could see new opportunities for political resistance. A destabilisa­
tion o f the system could also upset the delicate balance between Moscow 
and the Chechen leadership.
At the same time the econom ic situation in the Far East remains prob­
lematic. The remoteness of these regions makes outside supplies expensive, 
and the cost o f living is noticeably higher than in many other parts o f 
Russia. In the first h alf o f the decade the price o f the basket o f goods used 
by the statistical agency Rosstat in these regions cost between 110 and 135 
percent o f the Russian average.2 So to obtain the same standard o f living in
2 Figures for 2013: Primorye 121 percent, Khabarovsk 133 percent, Amur 113 percent.
Rosstat, Regiony Rossii: Social’no-Ekonomicheskie Pokazateli 2014 [Russia's regions: Socio-eco­
nomic indicators 2014] (Moscow, 2014).
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the Far East, the nom inal income must be considerably higher than the 
average. Only in Khabarovsk region did nom inal per-capita income make 
up for the higher prices in the mid-2010s. In Primorye per-capita income in 
2013 was 94 percent o f the average, in Amur 95 percent. Thus taking into 
account price differences, real income in Amur amounted to just 84 per­
cent o f the national average, in Primorye even less at 78 percent. Although 
this still does not put the Far East among Russia's poorest regions, the 
political and econom ic elites cannot for the foreseeable future expect the 
centre to supply development stimuli or ensure rising incomes. Instead 
government programmes to modernise the regions have been suspended 
as the econom ic crisis places growing pressure on the federal budget. Inte­
grating Crimea, increasing military spending and expanding international 
military engagement siphon o ff further resources.
Unlike places like the North Caucasus, the three Far Eastern border 
regions possess an abundant source o f income in the guise o f trade with 
China, which at least partly compensates the internal economic imbalances.
Since the end o f the Soviet Union a network o f form al and inform al busi­
ness ties with China has emerged, upon which the prosperity o f both the 
econom ic and political elites and the population at large depend. In 2013 
about 50 percent o f Primorye region's foreign trade was with China.3 For 
Khabarovsk the figure was 46 percent (followed by South Korea with 20 per­
cent and Japan with 9 percent).4 As far as Amur is concerned, China ac­
counted for 90 percent o f its exports o f goods and 77 percent of its imports.5
Since the breakdown in relations between Russia and the West, however,
Moscow's econom ic protectionism endangers ties between Russia's Far 
East and China more than ever before. Russia's econom ic policy continues 
to rest upon a strategy o f import substitution, aiming to boost domestic 
production by imposing high tariff barriers to ward o ff international com­
petition. Three factors are decisive. Firstly, this reduces dependency on 
other countries, in line with the Kremlin's stance o f granting priority to 
security aspects. Secondly, import substitution is regarded as a sensible 
strategy to achieve econom ic development and make the protected sectors 
competitive in the longer term. Here Moscow ignores criticisms from econo­
mists that this approach has rarely been successful anywhere. Thirdly, 
import substitution also benefits certain internationally uncompetitive 
sectors in Russia and is therefore supported by their lobbyists. For exam­
ple, in 2014 Russian textile producers asked President Putin to restrict 
textile imports.6 For all its political and econom ic overtures to Beijing,
3 “Kitay stal krupneyshym torgovym partnerom Primorskogo kraya Rossii” [China 
becomes Russian region of Primorje's most important trading partner ], website of the 
Association for Promotion of Sino-Russian Trade, 12 August 2013, http://www.cniru.ru/ 
index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=9&id=796 (accessed 23 September 2015).
4 Ministry of Economic Development of Khabarovsk Region, Vneshnyaya torgovlya Khabarov- 
skogo kraya w 2013 godu [Foreign trade of Khabarovsk region 2013], (Khabarovsk, n.d.), 
http://minec.khabkrai.ru/content/2013 (accessed 10 September 2015).
5 Amurstat, Vneshneekonomicheskaya deyatel'nost' Amurskoy oblasti za 2005-2013 gody [Foreign 
trade activity of Amur region 2005-2013] (Blagoveshchensk, 2014).
6 “Associaciya tekstilshchikov prosit Putina za pretit' vvoz tkaney iz ES” [Association of Tex-
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Moscow shows no sign o f opening its markets to China, and continues to 
regard its eastern neighbour only as a source o f loans and investment. Pro­
tectionism is also behind Moscow’s recent initiative to raise Eurasian 
Union tariffs on Chinese imports.
This policy directly endangers a vital source o f revenue for the Far East­
ern border regions. The later dismissed governors found themselves forced 
not only to protect their own incomes but also to avoid massive popular 
dissatisfaction -  for which the centre would have punished them. Thus the 
origins o f the conflict lie in the contradiction between the econom ic inter­
ests o f regional actors and the actions o f federal forces driven by a combi­
nation o f economic, security and ideological objectives. But over time the 
conflict gains a life o f its own that transcends the original motives.
Tempting as it might appear to interpret the governors’ initiative as a 
step towards decentralisation and democratisation o f a hypercentralised 
political system, a glance at Russia’s post-Soviet history warns caution. 
Under the weak President Boris Yeltsin many governors exploited their de 
facto autonomy to assert sweeping power over their regions. At the 
regional level, for example in Bashkortostan, Kalmykia and Tyva, regimes 
emerged that were considerably more authoritarian than today’s Russian 
central state.7 Moreover, civil society in the regions is too rudimentary to 
stand up to local political leaders.
The crisis also demonstrates the fragility o f the Sino-Russian rapproche­
m ent, despite the post-2014 boost. Old grudges and threat perceptions 
reappear in Russian elites and society, which fear above all a Chinese “colo­
nisation” o f the Far East. Fears now focus not on Chinese mass immigra­
tion, as was the case in the 1 990s ,8 but suspicions that China might exploit 
its enormous power advantage to directly seize the resources o f the Rus­
sian Far East. Points o f friction also exist beyond the immediate border 
regions, with Moscow continuing to observe with concern China’s growing 
influence, especially in Central Asia.
The Russian leadership feels existentially threatened by the domestic 
crisis, and deliberately stokes fear o f external enemies. NATO, the United 
States and the European Union are the obvious traditional targets, already 
standing under fundamental suspicion o f pursuing regime change in 
Russia. But now Moscow even abandons its practice o f never officially criti­
cising Beijing or presenting China as a threat. Even if the danger o f escala­
tion is small, Sino-Russian relations cool noticeably. As a result Russia now 
has tense relations not only with the West, but also with China.
tile Producers asks Putin to ban textile imports from the EU], gazeta.ru, 8 September 2014, 
http://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2014/09/08/n_6460285.shtml (accessed 14 October 2015).
7 Anastassia V. Obydenkova and Alexander Libman, Causes and Consequences o f  Democratiza­
tion: The Regions o f Russia (Abingdon, 2015).
8 Mikhail Alexseev, Parting with “Asian Balkans": Perceptions o f  Chinese Migration in the Russian 
Far East, 2000-2013, Ponars Eurasia Policy Memo 319 (April 2014), http://www. 
ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm319_Alexseev_April2014.pdf 
(accessed 29 October 2015).
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P e r s p e c t i v e s  a n d  O p t i o n s  f o r  G e r m a n y  a n d  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n
The strivings for autonomy in Russia's Far East and first fracturing o f the 
Sino-Russian relationship outlined in the scenario are o f great political 
relevance for Germany and the European Union. Yet at the same time 
Berlin and Brussels possess few instruments for influencing the situation 
in their interests.
Tensions in Sino-Russian relations cannot be expected to lead to any rap­
prochem ent between Russia and the West. While isolated symbolic steps 
are possible, this alters neither Moscow's claim to hegemony in the post­
Soviet space nor its deep conflict with the European Union and NATO over 
the European political and security order.
The destabilisation o f the “Putin System” further polarises the Russian 
debate in Germany and the European Union. Those who call for greater co­
operation with Moscow despite the crisis over Ukraine and differences over 
the Middle East see their position confirmed by the domestic crisis in 
Russia. They interpret the autonomy m ovement in the Far East at the 
beginnings o f a collapse o f the state that would also be dangerous for 
Europe, and call for the West to make overtures to Putin as supposed guar­
antor o f stability, support him in his power struggle with the Far East 
elites, lift the sanctions imposed in response to Russia's actions in Ukraine 
without concessions from  Moscow, and readmit Russia into the G7. On the 
other side are those who argue that the correct response to Russia's 
authoritarian hardening at hom e and aggressive policies abroad is to 
adopt an unyielding stance towards the Kremlin. They urge for support to 
be given to the Far East autonomy movement, which they see as an oppor­
tunity to weaken the “Putin System”.
Berlin and Brussels should do neither. Ultimately, the decentralisation 
ambitions o f the regional political and business elites have as little to do 
with strengthening a democratic division o f powers as Putin alone guaran­
tees state stability. Germany and the European Union should therefore 
remain neutral in the conflict and call for peaceful conflict resolution and 
respect for the principles o f democracy and rule o f law. If civil society en­
gagement for more democracy were to grow in the course o f the conflict, 
Brussels and Berlin could discreetly support this development. Extreme 
sensitivity is required here, because experience shows that supporting civil 
society activities can lead to greater repression against the civil society 
itself by the regime.
The European Union and Germany possess only modest possibilities for 
influencing the outlined explosive development. Given that the scenario 
involves an internal conflict between federal and regional elites, interven­
tion by the European Union is neither realistic nor desirable. Instead Ger­
many and Europe must respond with sophisticated, nuanced and well-co­
ordinated small steps, by which they can contribute to conflict resolution 
without betraying their own principles and values.
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Small Cause, Large Effect: Rapid Loss of Bees in 
North Africa Endangers a Fragile Region
Bettina Rudloff and Nils Simon
From 2020 North Africa experiences extensive and unexpected failures o f 
fruit and vegetable crops, one o f the region's main exports. The cause is a 
massive bee die off, triggered by a newly introduced parasite and worsened 
by inappropriate counter-measures in the affected countries. The outcome 
is devastating: the most im portant crop plants are no longer pollinated.
Food prices explode and rural incomes collapse. Unrest grips the socie­
ties o f the region, which already stand under severe economic, political 
and social stress. The situation is rem iniscent o f the beginnings o f the Arab 
Spring in 2011, when high food prices similarly triggered mass protests. 
Now destabilisation again threatens the still fragile region.
These events come at a sensitive juncture for the European Union, 
whose long-term Mediterranean Partnership already stands accused o f con­
tributing neither to econom ic nor political stability in North Africa. In fact 
early prevention and ecologically sensible counter-measures could have 
helped avert the worst o f the crisis.
A  P a r a s i t e  o n  B o a r d
Two stowaways were hiding in the wares o f a flower trader from East Africa: 
a specimen o f a previously isolated bee species, and on its back a hitherto 
unknown parasite. Arriving in North Africa, the parasite finds perfect 
living conditions among the local honey bees. It reproduces rapidly, and 
within a few years has killed more than 90 percent o f colonies. Attempts 
by beekeepers to quickly repopulate their hives fail because the parasite 
also carries a highly contagious virus.
North Africa is especially dependent on functioning pollination, above 
all in the Egyptian Nile Delta and certain regions o f Tunisia and Libya.1 
The region's decisive export products -  fruit, vegetables and nuts -  are 
largely pollinated by insects. Egypt alone produces 21.6 million tonnes of 
fruit and vegetables annually, one fifth o f the total quantity produced in 
the EU-28.
The affected states respond by encouraging farmers to massively intensify 
production to make up for the losses. But this eviscerates flower diversity, 
eliminating the already scarce habitats and breeding places for the wild 
bees that, alongside honey bees, are responsible for a significant propor­
tion o f pollination. This leads very rapidly to the almost complete loss o f 
pollination as a central production factor. Yields o f the most important
1 Sven Lautenbach, Ralf Seppelt, Julia Liebscher and Carsten F. Dormann, “Spatial and
Temporal Trends of Global Pollination Benefit”, PLOS One 7, no. 4 (2012).
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P o l l i n a t i o n  -  C e n t r a l  F a c t o r  i n  t h e  G l o b a l  F o o d  S u p p l y
Of the 115 plants m ost widely used in global agriculture, 85 depend to 
a greater or lesser extent on animal pollination. In terms o f production 
volume the figure is somewhat lower, because grain crops for example 
are wind-pollinated. Overall it can be said that 35 percent o f agricul­
tural crop production is partly or fully dependent on pollination by 
insects and other animals.a It is calculated that a complete loss o f these 
forms o f pollination would reduce global agricultural production by 3 
to 8 percent.b The direct econom ic losses in such an event are put at 
€ 1 5 3  billion per annum ,c the figures for the United States and the 
European Union approximately $15 billion and € 1 5  billion respectively. 
For all the uncertainty involved in such prognoses, the order o f magni­
tude is considerable. The sum is equivalent to the total global develop­
m ent aid for 2013.
a Alexandra-Maria Klein, Bernard E. Vaissiere, James H. Cane, Ingolf Steffan-Dewenter, 
Saul A. Cunningham, Claire Kremen and Teja Tscharntke, “Importance of Pollinators 
in Changing Landscapes for World Crops”, Proceedings o f the Royal Society B 274, no. 1608 
(2007): 303-13.
b Marcelo A. Aizen, Lucas A. Garibaldi, Saul A. Cunningham and Alexandra M. Klein, 
“How Much Does Agriculture Depend on Pollinators? Lessons from Long-Term Trends 
in Crop Production”, Annals o f  Botany 103, no. 9 (2009): 1579-88.
c Nick Hanley, Tom D. Breeze, Ciaran Ellis and David Goulson, “Measuring the Economic 
Value of Pollination Services: Principles, Evidence and Knowledge Gaps”, Ecosystem 
Services 14 (2015): 124-32; Nicola Gallai, Jean-Michel Salles, Josef Settele and Bernard E. 
Vaissiere, “Economic Valuation of the Vulnerability of World Agriculture Confronted 
with Pollinator Decline”, Ecological Economics 68, no. 3 (2009): 810-21.
agricultural exports collapse, and improved EU m arket access for agricul­
tural products, realised just a few years previously, turns out to be worth­
less. The incomes o f the affected farmers in North Africa plummet, social 
unrest ensues. Population movements follow, first to the cities, then head­
ing for Europe.
R e p e r c u s s i o n s  f o r  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n  a n d  G e r m a n y
The renewed destabilisation o f North Africa threatens negative consequences 
for Europe that are not restricted to foreign policy and security. The col­
lapse o f food production in the region also incurs economic, social and 
ecological costs north o f the Mediterranean.
Initially southern European producers enjoy rising profits, as competi­
tors fall by the wayside and their own sales increase correspondingly. 
Although North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean account for only 
about one fifth o f all fruit and vegetable imports into the European 
U nion,2 the loss o f this share restricts supply enough to increase consumer
2 Eurostat, “Agriculture in the ENP-South Countries: Largely Determined by Climatic Con­
ditions and Influenced by Cultural Values” (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
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prices in Europe noticeably. This hits Germany especially hard as the Euro­
pean Union's largest consumer market. German per-capita consumption of 
fresh and processed fruit is about 100 kilograms per annum, with a similar 
figure for vegetables.3 Additional harm  is incurred when existing nutri­
tional programmes, for example providing fruit in schools, are hindered 
by rising costs. In an extreme case, higher prices for fruit and vegetables 
could leave only affluent households able to afford to eat healthily. Qualita­
tive undersupply (“hidden hunger”) has long been a problem in developing 
countries. It could worsen further, especially through vitamin A deficiency, 
if rising prices make fruit and vegetables unaffordable for the poorest.4
In the past the European Union has responded to exploding grain prices 
by increasing food aid, for example for Tunisia. An expansion o f longer- 
term  development aid could also become necessary to compensate for the 
crop failures. This could place an extra cost burden on the only recently 
revamped European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (ENPARD).
C o u n t e r - m e a s u r e s :  P r e v e n t i o n  a n d  I m p r o v e d  M o n i t o r i n g
A series o f national and international pollinator conservation initiatives 
already exist, m ost o f which have attracted very little attention.5 This 
changed in June 2014, after the media coverage accompanying US Presi­
dent Barack Obama's announcem ent o f the founding o f the Pollinator 
Health Task Force. In May 2015 the multi-agency working group presented 
its first report and a programme o f action. The latter concentrates on the 
protection o f a number o f key species, at the same time as promoting the 
renaturation o f almost three million hectares o f land as a refuge for all 
types o f pollinators. From 2016 $82 million are earmarked for this in the 
budgets o f the responsible federal agencies. Individual US states are also 
already responding, for example with stronger regulation o f pesticides 
that are potentially harmful to bees.
Although the European Union already possesses a framework that ac­
counts for the needs o f pollinators, in the shape o f its Sustainable Develop­
m ent Strategy and Biodiversity Strategy, EU-wide mainstream ing in rele-
explained/index.php/Agriculture_statistics_-_North_Africa_and_Eastern_Mediterranean 
(accessed 24 September 2015).
3 Robert-Koch-Institut, Zahlen und Trends aus der Gesundheitsberichterstattung des Bundes 
(Berlin, 2011), 3.
4 Matthew R. Smith, Gitanjali M. Singh, Dariush Mozaffarian and Samuel S. Myers, 
“Effects of Decreases of Animal Pollinators on Human Nutrition and Global Health: A 
Modelling Analysis”, Lancet (published online 16 July 2015); Rebecca Chaplin-Kramer, 
Emily Dombeck, James Gerber, Katherine A. Knuth, Nathaniel D. Mueller, Megan Mueller, 
Guy Ziv and Alexandra-Maria Klein, “Global Malnutrition Overlaps with Pollinator-Depen­
dent Micronutrient Production”, Proceedings o f  the Royal Society B 281 (published online 17 
September 2014).
5 Andrew Byrne and Üna Fitzpatrick, “Bee Conservation Policy at the Global, Regional 
and National Levels”, Apidologie 40, no. 3 (2009): 194-210.
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vant policy spheres is still lacking, as is a pollinator action plan that could 
serve as its basis. Such an action plan should cover the following aspects:
► The European Union should continue to promote the m onitoring of 
honey bees and wild bees, both within its own borders and world-wide. 
A start was made with the ongoing Pollination Assessment Report o f the 
Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosys­
tem Services (IPBES).
► Internationally supported agricultural projects should be selected and 
assessed also according to their impact on pollinators and the extent to 
which they are dependent on them. Habitat preservation and natural 
pest control could be added to the project goals. This is already provided 
for in the second pillar o f the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 
under which so-called agri-environmental measures can be rewarded. 
But the needs o f pollinators should be taken into account more explicitly 
in the future.
► Pesticide approval procedures, especially for systemic neonicotinoids, 
must take into account how the substances affect insects, predators and 
prey under realistic conditions in the field. Interactions with other agri­
cultural chemicals must also be considered. This would contribute to 
stabilising pollinator populations everywhere, not just in North Africa.
► Technological solutions, such as breeding self-pollinating strains, are 
also conceivable. This could help to reduce the econom ic risk o f pollina­
tion failure. Increased manual pollination is also possible, as practised 
for example in Chinese orchards and Madagascan vanilla plantations. 
But this method is economically feasible only where wage costs are very 
low. The growing trade in pollinators, in turn, can in fact have counter­
productive effects. Imported species may spread at the expense o f native 
pollinators or worse still introduce alien viruses and pests. Such risks 
can be reduced by strengthening local populations and enforcing stricter 
controls on the international trade in honeybees and bumblebees.
Pollinators are an essential factor for global food security. That is an 
important reason to protect them  -  but not the only one.6 More broadly, 
the scenario upon which this contribution is based demonstrates what 
large risks can potentially emerge even from rather obscure spheres of 
econom ic life.
6 David Kleijn, Rachael Winfree, Ignasi Bartomeus, Luisa G. Carvalheiro, Mickael Henry 
et al., “Delivery of Crop Pollination Services Is an Insufficient Argument for Wild Pollina­
tor Conservation”, Nature Communications 6 (published online 16 June 2015).
SWP Berlin
Foresight 2015
January 2016
35
Rapid Loss of Bees in North Africa Endangers a Fragile Region
Risk Factors for Pollinators:
Lack o f Data and Productivity Pressure
Pollination-related crises arise through the interaction o f many risk 
factors encountering an already fragile situation. Here a single new 
elem ent or the worsening o f an existing problem can trigger a cascade 
leading to massive pollination failure.a
The lack o f m onitoring risks unexpected pollination failures. There 
is, for example, little reliable inform ation on current pollinator popu­
lations in North Africa. Although data from the UN Food and Agricul­
ture Organisation (FAO) shows the number o f managed beehives rising 
world-wide, its data for North Africa is patchy and error-ridden. The 
very few m onitoring studies that do exist on the situation o f wild bees 
-  which accomplish a substantial proportion o f pollination -  suggest 
that wild bee populations have dropped noticeably in certain regions.b
Another form  o f control is also deficient. Although Sustainability Im­
pact Assessments (SIAs) are conducted for every EU trade agreement, in 
the case o f the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement the original assess­
ments from  2006 were updated in 2014 by conducting an analysis o f 
the new Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).c But a de­
tailed focus on species diversity including pollination is lacking here.
Two further interconnected risk factors are the focus on monocul­
tures and heavy use o f pesticides to increase yields. The European 
U nion’s concentration on relevant exports promotes the large-scale 
cultivation o f single crops and increases dependency on agricultural 
chemicals such as fertilisers and pesticides.d At the same time impor­
tant breeding habitats for insects are lost. The use o f pesticides is also 
associated with considerable risks for pollinators. The widely used sys­
tem ic neonicotinoids are especially controversial. There is evidence 
that bees react highly sensitively to these substances, wild bees even 
more strongly than honeybees.e
a Dave Goulson, Elizabeth Nicholls, Cristina Botlas and Ellen L. Rotheray, “Bee De­
clines Driven by Combined Stress from Parasites, Pesticides, and Lack of Flowers”, 
Science 347, no. 6229 (2015); Adam J. Vanbergen, Insect Pollinators Initiative, “Threats 
to an Ecosystem Service: Pressures on Pollinators”, Frontiers in Ecology and the Environ­
ment 11 (2013): 251-259 ; J. Jelle Lever, Egbert H. van Nes, Marten Scheffer and Jordi 
Bascompte, “The Sudden Collapse of Pollinator Communities”, Ecology Letters 17, no. 3 
(2014): 350-59.
b European Academies Science Advisory Council (EASAC), Ecosystem Services, Agriculture 
and Neonicotinoids, EASAC Policy Report 26 (2015); Simon G. Potts, Jacobus C. Biesmeijer, 
Claire Kremen, Peter Neumann, Oliver Schweiger and William E. Kunin, “Global Polli­
nator Declines: Trends, Impacts and Drivers”, Trends in Ecology and Evolution 25, no. 6 
(2010): 345-53.
c See for example for Egypt: Ecorys, Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment in Support o f  
Negotiations o f  a DCFTA between the EU and Egypt: Final Interim Technical Report (Rotterdam, 
30 June 2014).
d Sameeh A. Mansour, “Environmental Impact of Pesticides in Egypt”, Reviews o f En­
vironmental Contamination and Toxicology 196 (2008): 1-51.
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e EASAC, Ecosystem Services, Agriculture and Neonicotinoids (see note b); Maj Rundlöf, 
Georg K. S. Andersson, Riccardo Bommarco, Ingemar Fries, Veronica Hederström et 
al., “Seed Coating with a Neonicotinoid Insecticide Negatively Affects Wild Bees”, 
Nature 521 (2015): 77 -80 ; H. Charles J. Godfray, Tjeerd Blacquiere, Linda M. Field, 
Rosemary S. Hails, Gillian Petrokofsky et al., “A Restatement of the Natural Science 
Evidence Base Concerning Neonicotinoid Insecticides and Insect Pollinators”, Proceed­
ings o f  the Royal Society B 281 (published online 21 May 2014); Tjeerd Blacquiere, Guy 
Smagghe, Cornelis A. M. van Gestel and Veerle Mommaerts, “Neonicotinoids in Bees: 
A Review on Concentrations, Side-effects and Risk Assessment”, Ecotoxicology 21, no. 4 
(2012): 973-92.
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2020 -  How Germany and the EU Overcame the 
Great Refugee Crisis
Steffen Angenendt, Anne Koch and Amrei Meier
Germany in 2020: Here, and across the European Union, the refugee crisis 
no longer dominates the political agenda. Not that there has been any 
decline in population movements: In each o f the preceding years more 
than one million people have applied for asylum in the EU. But now, im­
migration no longer concentrates on Germany, and threatens neither the 
country's internal stability nor the cohesion o f the EU as a whole. Instead, 
inflows o f refugees and migrants take place in an orderly manner. In Ger­
many, reception centres are well-equipped, asylum procedures are firmly 
established and their duration is significantly reduced. Debates on reintro­
ducing border controls within the EU have vanished. Political cooperation 
within the EU has been strengthened; trafficking and fatalities at the 
external borders have been significantly reduced. Opinion polls show that 
welcoming attitudes towards refugees have increased, because that they 
are perceived as people who can make a positive contribution to their host 
societies.
Only five years earlier the situation was rather different. By the end of 
2015 Germany and the European Union were looking over the ruins o f their 
existing asylum policy, and facing one o f the greatest tests o f European co­
operation since the integration process began after 1945. In Germany an 
already emotionally charged discussion about asylum and immigration 
threatened to explode. Despite a hitherto unparalleled wave o f voluntary 
support for asylum-seekers, right-wing groups and populist movements 
received growing support. A radical racist minority threatened reception 
facilities across the country and mobilised violent protests against refugee 
accommodation facilities. Member states along the EU's external borders 
invested massively in border security, others threatened to reintroduce 
perm anent controls at the internal borders and thus end freedom o f move­
m ent within the Union.
In this situation the German governm ent called a round table to discuss 
how to cope with the asylum crisis, inviting representatives o f the political 
parties, the federal states, local authorities, business, trade unions, 
churches, charities, researchers and migrant groups. Although represent­
ing very different interests, the participants concluded that a policy orien­
tated on single issues would not suffice to address a crisis o f these dimen­
sions. Instead the focus o f the debate shifted to the connections between 
asylum, immigration and integration, searching for joined-up solutions 
for the entire complex. Above all, the participants agreed to replace the 
“bottleneck” o f the single asylum process with flexible approaches more in 
tune with reality.
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The “Coalition for Action on Asylum and Migration” that emerged from 
the round table prepared the so-called Asylum Strategy 2020, a compre­
hensive plan o f action pursuing twin goals. On the one side, it provided for 
a reduction o f the burden on the asylum system through setting out 
special arrangements for individuals in clear need o f protection, speeding 
up the asylum process while m aintaining high standards o f protection, ex­
panding legal immigration options, achieving European responsibility 
sharing, and supporting countries o f first asylum outside the EU. On the 
other side, new integration instruments were introduced for prospective 
long-term residents.
R e d u c i n g  t h e  B u r d e n  o n  t h e  A s y l u m  S y s t e m
Now, refugees with good prospects o f recognition are offered a new type of 
protection outside the asylum process. This is initially granted for a period 
o f five years, after which those who have made use o f particular integra­
tion offers are to be granted unlimited leave to remain. In 2017, applying 
this new protection scheme to Syrian refugees reduced the number of 
asylum applications by 140,000. The instrum ent proved so successful that 
it was quickly emulated in neighbouring European states. These individual 
initiatives then formed the basis for an EU-wide jo in t strategy for Syrian 
refugees under the 2001 EU Directive on Temporary Protection. In addi­
tion, charities, Non-Governmental Organisations and families are now per­
mitted to actively engage in the reception process as sponsors and accom­
modation providers. In particular, “private im m igration” and “private 
asylum” arrangements were introduced. These were modelled after the 
Canadian example, where non-state organisations and individuals agree to 
cover all costs for a period o f ten years.
At the beginning o f 2017, the German government reconsidered its line 
on so-called safe countries o f origin. As the experience o f the preceding 
years had shown, simply adding a country to this list did not lead to a sub­
stantial reduction in asylum-seekers arriving from it. While the govern­
m ent retained the accelerated procedure for citizens o f such countries, it 
linked the categorisation o f a state as a safe country o f origin to the estab­
lishm ent o f training centres in the country and o f bilateral labour recruit­
m ent programmes (especially for the service and care sectors). The opening 
o f legal migration paths and the preparation o f migrants for the German 
labour m arket initially m et with cautious demand, but acceptance soon 
grew both on the part o f German employers and on the side of the migrants. 
For the W estern Balkans a direct connection can now be identified be­
tween the falling number o f asylum applications and participation in 
labour migration programmes.
The government also succeeded in resuming the talks on a perm anent 
European system for distributing asylum-seekers that had been broken off 
in winter 2015. After it became apparent that certain EU member states 
would only very half-heartedly realise the redistribution o f 160,000 refu­
gees agreed in September 2015, and were threatening to subvert the shar­
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ing o f responsibilities in practice, the debate about a perm anent distribu­
tion system was conducted only with the willing member states. A core 
group o f eleven countries agreed on criteria for a fair sharing o f refugee 
arrivals, to which another six countries then signed up. The group agreed 
that the new formula would not necessarily be used for physical redistri­
bution but as a basis for a fair financial compensation system that largely 
permitted refugees to choose where they wished to settle.
In a large-scale EU-wide pilot project interested local authorities were 
encouraged to accept refugees by offering them  financial support consid­
erably higher than the incurred costs. This pilot project constituted a 
ground-breaking shift from  the usual top-down process o f refugee distribu­
tion towards a bottom-up approach considering the needs and interests o f 
local communities. Now, local communities can profit from welcoming 
and integrating refuges. So far, especially low-income and demographically 
shrinking communities have applied for the new programme.
In addition, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) was given more 
staff and the EU’s Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund was consider­
ably enlarged. These measures made it easier for EU member states to 
harm onise their standards for asylum procedures, accommodation and 
integration services.
Finally, financial and institutional support for countries o f first asylum 
was further expanded, especially for Syria’s neighbours and North African 
and sub-Saharan African countries, in order to reduce secondary move­
ments from  there. Alongside the existing programmes for healthcare and 
accommodation, special attention was given to school attendance and 
refugees’ economic and entrepreneurial activities. In order to provide fur­
ther assistance and ensure particularly vulnerable groups access to inter­
national protection under European standards, the Federal Ministry o f the 
Interior in cooperation with the Federal Ministry o f Economic Cooperation 
and Development and the Foreign Ministry set up a resettlem ent pro­
gramme for initially 60 ,000  particularly vulnerable persons per year. Staff 
from the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) in cooperation 
with representatives o f the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu­
gees (UNHCR) select these refugees in the countries o f first asylum and 
assist them  in travelling to Germany.
Taken together these measures have led to a substantial shortening of 
the asylum process. Despite upholding high standards, the average pro­
cessing time is now just three m onths. Rejected asylum-seekers who do not 
face persecution or other dangers in their country o f origin and cannot 
claim other grounds for protection are deported more rigorously than 
before. But high standards o f protection continue to come first. The overall 
effect o f the Asylum Strategy 2020 has been to restore popular confidence 
in Germany’s asylum policy and the governm ent’s ability to control migra­
tion policy.
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E f f e c t i v e  I n t e g r a t i o n
In order to assist the municipalities, the German government massively 
increased its transfers to the federal states and local authorities. A consti­
tutional am endm ent permitted central government to channel funds for 
refugees directly to the local authorities and thus lend them  short- and 
medium-term support. Federal funds were used to create an Integration 
and Participation Fund that channels additional resources to local author­
ities that accept extra refugees, yet permits them  to decide freely how to 
spend the money. This improved the staffing and funding o f integration 
policy, contributing decisively to the successful resolution o f the refugee 
crisis in Germany. Equally im portant was the pooling o f all relevant 
responsibilities in a new Federal Ministry for Migration and Integration.
There have been m ajor changes in the housing o f refugees. First o f all 
the “Königstein form ula” has been abolished as the sole distribution 
method for asylum-seekers and refugees. Refugees now have a say in choos­
ing their place o f residence, in particular where reuniting families is con­
cerned. Secondly, most refugees are no longer housed in collective accom­
modation but live in their own homes under the so-called “Leverkusen 
m odel”. Having refugees living as neighbours in established communities 
facilitates integration. Local advice and support services run by refugee 
initiatives and charities make a decisive contribution to integration. Ulti­
mately, decentralised accommodation has cut costs for local authorities 
and contributed to a greater acceptance o f refugees in the population.
Considerable additional funds now flow into schooling and vocational 
training for refugees. Children and adolescents immediately join school 
lessons. Apart from  receiving additional German teaching in small groups, 
they are integrated into normal classes, rather than being taught separately 
from German and established immigrant pupils in so-called integration or 
welcome classes. Classroom teachers are supported by student teachers, 
who complete part o f their teaching experience as personal m entors for 
refugees. In a Hamburg pilot project launched in 2018, teachers o f classes 
with a high proportion o f refugee children have been receiving support 
from teachers who themselves came to Germany as refugees. If the project 
proves successful other states have indicated their interest in sim ilar 
models.
Language support for refugees and easier access to the labour m arket 
are two central components o f the new integration policy. Language learn­
ing is promoted by offering a better range o f German courses. The success­
ful Bavarian pilot scheme “Initial Orientation and German Teaching for 
Asylum-Seekers” was expanded to the whole o f Germany in early 2016. 
Since then even those whose asylum application is still pending can par­
ticipate in German courses quickly and without bureaucratic hurdles. A 
well-resourced childcare system, partly funded by the childcare allowance 
declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2015, 
makes it easier for m others to access language courses. The ban on asylum- 
seekers entering the labour m arket has been reduced to one m onth and
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the requirem ent to give priority to equally qualified EU nationals has been 
suspended.
Alongside these legal changes, administrative reforms have also made a 
decisive contribution to integrating refugees more quickly into the labour 
market. The Federal Employment Agency joined with the chambers of 
commerce and industry, the employers’ organisations and the trade 
unions to found a public body to integrate asylum-seekers with relevant 
skills as quickly as possible into the German labour market. Now educa­
tion, qualifications and career aspirations are recorded during the asylum 
process. On the basis o f this inform ation local advice services assist asylum- 
seekers in finding suitable adaptation and training measures and in 
applying for jobs. The new state integration policy has also strongly en­
couraged private engagement in refugee integration. One outcome o f this 
is the strengthening o f numerous neighbourhood initiatives that assist 
refugees and other immigrants in everyday matters.
The successes o f this comprehensive integration policy are already 
obvious. Municipalities with a high proportion o f asylum-seekers profit 
from generous financial assistance. Most o f the costs incurred by central 
government are balanced by the integration measures functioning as an 
econom ic stimulus package for rural areas. On the one hand, the spending 
translates into orders for local and regional businesses; on the other jobs 
are created for nursery staff, teachers, language instructors and social 
workers. In particular economically underdeveloped regions profit from 
this development. Investments in expanding childcare and schools also 
benefit the local population. Beyond this, the immigrants are prepared for 
the German labour m arket and subsequently often taken on by local busi­
nesses that previously experienced difficulties recruiting trainees and 
keeping skilled staff. These developments have generated competition for 
asylum-seekers in certain regions.
L o n g e r - t e r m  S t r a t e g i e s
In 2020 the annual net immigration to Germany, whether as asylum- 
seekers, workers, family members or for education and training, amounts 
to about 500,000. This at least party compensates the demographic shrink­
ing and ageing o f the autochthonous population. Immigrants have be­
come vital to m eet the needs o f German firms for skilled workers, and even 
low-skilled migrants make a positive contribution to funding the social 
systems. The same applies to other EU states with healthy economies.
Beyond these decisive factors at the national level, Germany has also 
emerged from  the m ajor refugee crisis strengthened internationally. The 
fact that a core group o f EU states were able to agree on a European shar­
ing o f responsibilities has led to greater solidarity and more willingness 
for dialogue between the affected countries. This trend now acts as a cata­
lyst for a more comprehensive jo in t migration policy in Europe. The politi­
cal weight o f the countries that have so far boycotted a fair distribution 
has tangibly shrunk in this process, with the result that further states plan
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to participate. Through its resolute advocacy for a generous intake o f refu­
gees and a comprehensive, coherent but at the same time pragmatic 
migration and refugee policy, Germany has strengthened its leading role 
on migration policy at the European level and boosted its influence inter­
nationally. This has also been consolidated through its leading participa­
tion in global consultation processes like the Global Forum on Migration 
and Development (GFMD). Additionally, the labour migration programmes 
in the Western Balkan states are dem onstrating their first successes on the 
ground and making an important contribution to stabilising this Euro­
pean neighbourhood.
For all the progress made, there is still room for improvement. The Ger­
man governm ent is therefore using resources and capacities gradually 
released by the resolution o f the refugee crisis to take preventive action. It 
is further expanding legal migration paths and deploying development aid 
to reduce the root causes o f displacement in the longer term and convert 
involuntary and unregulated movements into voluntary and regulated 
forms.
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Takes Command
Ronja Kempin and Barbara Lippert
A summer day in 2025, Werderscher Markt in Berlin. Like every m orning 
in the headquarters o f German diplomacy, trolleys trundle along the corri­
dors o f power. The post is being delivered. Today it contains information 
that will dominate the m orning meetings o f every division. It is the day 
the staff o f the German Federal Foreign Ministry receive the organigram 
o f the new “European Foreign Ministry”. On 1 September 2025 the Euro­
pean External Action Service (EEAS) will become a fully-fledged ministry, 
and all o f Germany's diplomats will become representatives o f the Euro­
pean Union. This represents the provisional culmination o f the Europeani­
sation o f German foreign policy.
D r i v e n  b y  I n t e r n a l  D y n a m i c s  o f  I n t e g r a t i o n
In the Ministry's canteen and International Club, too, the organigram is 
soon the topic o f the day. The diplomats readily agree that it was not exter­
nal shocks that motivated the twenty-eight EU m ember states to upgrade 
the EEAS. The European Union has certainly faced massive challenges in its 
neighbourhood during this period: the Ukraine conflict brought war back to 
Europe, while the refugee crisis o f 2015/2016 took the Union to the brink 
o f a break-up. And in the Middle East Iran and Saudi Arabia have been con­
ducting an arms race since they jointly defeated the Islamic State. But the 
decisive developments in European policy were internally driven, with one 
integration step following another until a spirited decision at the last inter­
governmental conference was all that was required to take the big leap.1
Originally, the EEAS began operating on 1 January 2011. Its first years 
were marked by institutional wrangling between the High Representative 
o f the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (under Article 22(2) 
TEU), the President o f the European Council (Article 15(6) TEU) and the 
President o f the European Commission (Article 17(1) TEU). The failure to 
clarify its external representation paralysed the Union, especially during 
the Arab Spring, its afterm ath and the subsequent efforts to reform  the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).2 The functioning o f the College of
1 Neither from a neo-functionalist nor a historical institutionalist or liberal intergovern­
mental perspective are individual integration steps automatic, still less deterministic 
processes. Instead political decisions are required at the “critical junctures”. See the cor­
responding contributions in Hans-Jürgen Bieling and Marika Lerch, eds., Theorien der euro­
päischen Integration, (Wiesbaden, 2005), in particular Melanie Morisse-Schilbach, “Histo­
rischer Institutionalismus”, 271-92 (284).
2 Cathleen Berger and Nicolai von Ondarza, The Next High Representative and the EEAS: 
Reforming the EU Foreign Policy Structures, SWP Comment 40/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen-
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Commissioners was tangibly enhanced under Jean-Claude Juncker's 2014­
2019 Presidency. A new project team, “Europe in the W orld”,3 succeeded in 
im plementing “The EU's Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict 
and Crises”4 and enabling the EU's foreign policy instruments to operate 
in concert. The “Global EU Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy” 
adopted in 2016 laid the basis for effective coordination o f the actions of 
the member states and the EU level in this sphere o f policy. It was agreed 
that the member states would initiate and shape foreign policy initiatives, 
but leave their implementation to the EEAS. The Treaty o f Stockholm, 
which came into force on 1 January 2023 to create a “real” econom ic and 
monetary union, constitutionalised this practice.
The model for the new relationship between EU member states and 
Brussels -  with the EU level strengthened -  was the “Germany-United 
Kingdom Initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina” o f November 2014, in 
which the two foreign ministers made proposals for reviving Sarajevo's EU 
convergence process. First o f all they ensured that their initiative was sup­
ported both within the region and by the United States. But then the High 
Representative assumed political leadership in successfully shaping the 
bilateral relationships.5
In order to implement foreign policy proposals, numerous national diplo­
mats moved to the EEAS. In parallel to this process the Europeanisation of 
foreign and security policy gained momentum. After 2010 the financial 
and debt crisis led many EU member states to slash their budgets for foreign 
policy and defence. Spain for example cut its foreign ministry's budget by 
two-thirds in the space o f four years, from € 3 .6 4  billion in 2009 to € 1 .3 4  
billion in 2013. In the course o f this economy drive, Madrid closed numer­
ous foreign representations -  as did the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece,
schaft und Politik, December 2013), http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/ 
comments/2013C40_bee_orz.pdf (accessed 23 July 2015).
3 The new team established by the Juncker Commission was headed by the High Repre­
sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the 
European Commission; its members included the Commissioners for European Neigh­
bourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, for Trade, for International Cooperation and 
Development, for Humanitarian Assistance and Crisis Management, for Climate Policy 
and Energy, for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, and for Transport. A dedicated 
Council formation for defence policy had already been formed.
4 European Commission, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The EU's 
Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises, 11 December 2013, http://eur-lex. 
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52013JC0030 (accessed 11 June 2015).
5 “Ein Neustart für Bosnien und Herzegowina”, joint contribution by German Foreign 
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and his British colleague Philip Hammond on the Ger­
many-United Kingdom initiative for a revival of the reform process in Bosnia and Herze­
govina and a reform of the convergence process with the European Union, Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 6 November 2014, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/ 
Interviews/2014/141106-BM_Hammond_FR.html (accessed 23 September 2015).
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Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal.6 Thanks to an agreement with 
the EEAS, whose 139 delegations possessed considerable larger material re­
sources, Spain succeeded in organising its diplomatic representation via 
the European External Action Service and delegating national diplomats to 
the EU em bassies.7 Numerous smaller member states copied this example.8
T h e  E u r o p e a n  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t r y
So now, in 2025, a m ajor step o f European integration has been taken. The 
EEAS’s upgrading entailed numerous changes in the structures o f European 
foreign policy (see Figure). Now there is a European Foreign Minister head­
ing a European Foreign Ministry in Brussels. In the m eantime the EU del­
egations in third countries have gradually been transform ed into EU em­
bassies, while the foreign ministries and embassies o f the member states 
have been dissolved and their staff transferred either to Brussels or to the 
new EU embassies. One half o f the Brussels staff is assigned to divisions, 
the other forms a floating reserve available for task forces to tackle crises.
In the national capitals EU delegations have been formed out o f the re­
mains o f the national foreign ministries, but staffed by personnel from 
across the Union. A chance is also offered to outsiders who have not passed 
through the traditional school o f diplomacy. The delegations function as 
the European U nion’s window into the member states and as foreign 
policy planning and competence centres. The Berlin delegation, for exam­
ple, is responsible for the European Union’s Central Asia strategy. The Ger­
man foreign m inister also had to go, as that post was abolished in all the 
m ember states. The tasks o f the foreign ministers are now officially taken 
over -  in view o f the general loss o f importance o f the foreign ministries -  
by the heads o f state and government. Correspondingly, the Foreign Affairs 
Council in Brussels has been abolished. Matters pertaining to the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) are now discussed and decided by the 
heads o f state and government in the European Council, together with the 
President o f the Commission and the European Foreign Minister.
L e a p i n g  i n t o  t h e  B l u e  i n  2 0 2 5
Not all the German diplomats in Berlin are happy about this turn in their 
careers and a “leap into the blue” that appears to them  as bold as Robert
6 Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik, eds., The European External Action Service and National Diplo­
macies, EPC Issue Paper 73 (March 2013), http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_ 
3385_the_eeas_and_national_diplomacies.pdf (accessed 23 September 2015).
7 Nicolai von Ondarza, “Weniger Geld und politischer Stillstand: Interne Effekte der 
Finanz- und Schuldenkrise auf die GASP”, in EU-Außenpolitik in Zeiten der Finanz- und Schul­
denkrise, ed. Ronja Kempin and Marco Overhaus, SWP-Studie 9/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wis­
senschaft und Politik, April 2013), 79-87 , http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/ 
products/studien/2013_S09_kmp_ovs.pdf (accessed 20 October 2015).
8 House of Lords, European Union Committee, The EU’s External Action Service, 11th Report 
of Session 2012-2013 (London, March 2013), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ 
ld201213/ldselect/ldeucom/147/147.pdf (accessed 23 September 2015).
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Figure: The future of European diplomacy
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Schuman felt about his own speech about merging German and French 
coal and steel production in 1950.9 In his farewell speech the departing Ger­
man Foreign Minister Botho Müller-Wohlfahrt envisions a bright future for 
his staff as European diplomats and lauds the birth o f the European For­
eign Ministry as the fulfilment o f German European policy. Playfully, the 
last German Foreign Minister asks w hether no-one had actually thought 
the process through to its very end and realised they would actually be 
abolishing themselves.10
Turning to the critics and waverers, Müller-Wohlfahrt rejects the objec­
tion that foreign states will not take the European Foreign Ministry in 
Brussels seriously, and instead continue to turn to London, Paris and Ber­
lin. Although one unwanted side-effect o f the power shift, Müller-Wohl­
fahrt said, might be that the heads o f state and government could expand 
their foreign policy staffs into little foreign ministries, he pointed out that 
these possessed no foreign representations. their only instrum ent abroad 
was the “national houses” that covered only the spectrum from national 
culture to trade. The national governments possessed no powers o f author­
ity and were dependent on expertise received from the European Foreign 
Ministry and the decentralised competence centres in the member states. 
This reorganisation would bring advantages, Müller-Wohlfahrt said, because 
an increasing integration o f those policy spheres where a differentiation 
between domestic and foreign policy is almost impossible had caused the 
failure o f attempts to shape politics through coordination. In order to en­
sure that national traditions, political and cultural characteristics, interests 
and specialisations continued to be incorporated into the process, Germa­
ny would -  like many other member states -  be retaining if  not expanding 
its training centres for future diplomats.
The departing foreign m inister also emphasised that even for a large 
member state like Germany, the fusion o f diplomatic services and the 
strengthening o f the European Union as a framework for action were ad­
vantageous. At the same time, he said, one had to keep the smaller mem­
ber states happy, because they rightly expected economies o f scale and had 
no need to tolerate form al downgrading. In no respect, he said, had the 
threshold to supranationalisation been crossed by the creation o f the Euro­
pean Foreign Ministry. Decisions, Müller-Wohlfahrt said, would naturally
9 French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, announcing the so-called Schuman Plan at a 
press conference on 9 May 1950. Jean Monnet, Erinnerungen eines Europäers (Munich, 1980), 388.
10 This is true to the extent that since the second half of the 1990s German policy on 
Europe had remained decidedly ambivalent and only tended to favour communitarisa- 
tion where this concerned “how on the basis of the existing CFSP structures under the 
given conditions the introduction of a communitisation -  in the sense of a partial con­
vergence with community processes and structures -  could be achieved”, as Uwe Schmalz 
puts it in “Die europäisierte Macht: Deutschland in der europäischen Außen- und Sicher­
heitspolitik”, in Eine neue deutsche Europapolitik? Rahmenbedingungen -  Problemfelder -  Optio­
nen, ed. Heinrich Schneider, Mathias Jopp and Uwe Schmalz, 515-80 (552) (Bonn, 2001). 
See also practitioners opposing supranational procedures: Wolfgang Ischinger and Eber­
hard Kölsch, “Was Mehrheitsentscheidungen erreichen können. Zur Gemeinsamen 
Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 May 1997.
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still be made by the heads o f state and government in the European Council, 
in which a state like Germany could hold its own. But no shift to majority 
decision-making had been agreed. The m inister’s farewell speech again 
underlined that the the U nion’s foreign policy would retain its hybrid 
character o f being supranational and intergovernm ental at the same time. 
Additionally, neither bilateralisms nor the form ation o f groups would en­
tirely disappear, he said. But in the area o f external relations the European 
Foreign Ministry now represented a community structure promoting the 
shared interests o f EU-Europeans with the potential to become interna­
tionally effective.
However, Müller-Wohlfahrt admitted, he was worried about the prob­
lem o f legitimacy. Although he hoped that a more flexible and effective 
foreign policy would strengthen the output legitimacy, interest in foreign 
policy questions was traditionally pronounced in only a handful o f EU 
states and restricted to expert circles.
Only recently the foreign m inister had found his concerns confirmed in 
a lucid confidential analysis in which researchers at a German think-tank 
laid out the structural restrictions on Europe’s foreign policy. A European 
public sphere, in the sense o f a border-transcending functional space in 
which debates could be conducted and European foreign policy find reso­
nance, was not to be expected for the foreseeable future, the experts argued, 
because communication spheres and media infrastructures remained na­
tionally constituted and lacked interconnectivity. Moreover, it had been 
seen that the social media were more suited as instruments for campaigns 
than as platforms for political dialogue. The paper continued: “Because the 
EU is only in a very limited sense a community o f experience and memory, 
and not a community o f communication and language, there are fundamen­
tal limits to a continuing Europeanisation o f the European community.”11 
National parliaments as the central sources o f legitimacy should there­
fore keepbetter pace with Europeanisation. In foreign policy debates they 
should considerably more strongly than hitherto reflect the developments 
in the political arena o f the Union. The same logic, the paper argued, 
applied to the media o f the member states. Ultimately, the paper points to 
a concrete problem that needs to be urgently addressed: the transfer of 
CFSP powers to the European Parliament.12 For all the progress on the road 
to a European foreign policy, appropriate participation by the legislative 
remains still a desideratum in 2025.
11 Peter Graf Kielmansegg, “Integration und Demokratie”, in Europäische Integration, 2nd 
ed., ed. Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch, 4 7 -72  (58). (Opladen, 2003). Other ex­
perts are more optimistic about the prospects for an Europeanisation of the public sphere. 
See Thomas Risse, ed., European Public Spheres: Politics Is Back (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, 2014).
12 For an alternative perspective see Annegret Bendiek, “Handlungsfähigkeit durch poli­
tische Führung in der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik”, in Entwicklungs­
perspektiven der EU: Herausforderungen für die deutsche Europapolitik, ed. Annegret Bendiek, 
Barbara Lippert and Daniela Schwarzer, SWP-Studie 18/2011 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissen­
schaft und Politik, July 2011): 60-69 , http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/ 
products/studien/2011_S18_bdk_lpt_swd_ks.pdf (accessed 20 October 2015).
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Foresight Retrospective: “One Land, One People, 
One Dream” -  Albanians Abolish their Borders
Dusan Reljic
It was supposed to be another o f those celebrations Albanians had seen so 
many o f in recent years. The heads o f government o f Albania and Kosovo 
were to ceremonially inaugurate a statue o f Ismail Qemali, nineteenth- 
century leader o f the Albanian national movement. But the press was 
already complaining that while almost every town “in the Albanian uni­
verse” o f South-East Europe already had at least one “patriotic” memorial, 
the record o f government achievements in remained threadbare in spring 
2019. Poverty and unemployment remained rampant, the EU accession 
talks were making no headway, the flow o f Albanian asylum-seekers into 
the European Union continued unabated, corruption was pervasive and 
quarrels with the “Orthodox” neighbours, the Serbs, Greeks and Macedo­
nians, continued. Hope had vanished that the European Union might soon 
rescind its visa requirements for citizens o f the Western Balkans, which it 
reimposed at the end o f 2015 in order to stem the flow o f migration. In 
order to dissipate popular dissatisfaction, the media asserted, politicians 
could come up with nothing better than to resort to a tried-and-tested 
scheme: a joyful celebration with historic flags, heroic songs and speeches 
announcing that the unification o f the Albanian nation would now finally 
be completed. Naturally in the context o f European integration, without 
altering any borders, the audience would be reassured with a nod and a 
wink, true to the motto: we do not intend to break our promise to Wash­
ington and Brussels that unification will occur only within the framework 
o f the European U nion.1
But this time the unexpected occurs. Even before the speeches can 
begin, the first chants are heard: “self-determ ination”, “unity” and “we are 
one nation” swell out o f the crowd. Standing at the edge o f the grounds 
several dozen young men, many o f them  with beards and headdress, chant 
praise to Allah. The secret police inconspicuously keep watch. These are 
some o f the many Albanian volunteers who have returned from jihad in 
Syria, Iraq and elsewhere.2 Soon the emotions boil, the crowd denounces the
1 This idea, expressed particularly succinctly by Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama at the 
unveiling of the Qemali monument in Pristina on 25 May 2015, has often been repeated 
by other dignitaries. “The Sculpture of Ismail Qemali Was Placed Today in Pristine”, RTK 
Live, 25 May 2015, http://www.rtklive.org/the-sculpture-of-ismail-qemali-was-placed-today- 
in-pristine (accessed 23 September 2015).
2 On the causes of the radicalisation of Albanian youth, see Shpend Kursani, Report In­
quiring into the Causes and Consequences o f Kosovo Citizens’ Involvement as Foreign Fighters in Syria 
and Iraq (Pristina: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, 2015), http://www.qkss.org/ 
repository/docs/Report_inquiring_into_the_causes_and_consequences_of_Kosovo_citizens% 
27_involvement_as_foreign_fighters_in_Syria_and_Iraq_307708.pdf (accessed 23 Septem­
ber 2015).
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“gang o f corrupt politicians” and the “hypocritical W est” and demands the 
founding o f a “natural Albania”. Some call for the immediate introduction 
o f sharia.
W ithin a few hours the unrest engulfs not only the whole o f Albania and 
Kosovo, but also many other areas from Montenegro in the north to Skopje 
(Republic o f Macedonia) in the south and the Presevo Valley (Serbia) in the 
east: in short, the entire “Albanian universe”. Protests also occur in Ioannina 
and other Greek cities with large Albanian immigrant populations. Soli­
darity rallies follow wherever the Albanian diaspora is concentrated -  in 
Switzerland, Germany, Austria and the US East Coast. An “Albanian spring” 
breaks out, carried by desperation at chronic mass poverty, disgust at the 
corruption o f the political class and yearning for national unity. The 
poorly paid security forces refuse to act against the demonstrators. In 
Kosovo the NATO-led international peacekeeping force KFOR is not capable 
o f intervening, having been reduced to a few dozen advisers. Tirana and 
Pristina now ask individual W estern states to send troops to restore public 
order. But W estern capitals see little possibility o f this, as their own forces 
are already committed to the war against Islamist extremists in the Middle 
East. Only Turkey offers to send its military. Neighbouring Serbia, Monte­
negro, Macedonia and Greece deploy troops to their borders and inquire 
discreetly in Moscow whether Russia might offer military assistance. The 
Kremlin is delighted to hold sway again in South-East Europe.3 The predic­
tion o f form er CIA analyst David B. Kanin appears to be coming true: “The 
local networks and external kibbitzers also are going to prove incapable of 
managing any muscular jihadist or nationalist violence that develops in 
the Balkan security vacuum.”4
D e v e l o p m e n t s  s i n c e  2 0 1 1 :  A m b i g u o u s  T a l k ,  D i r e c t e d  A c t i o n
Such a possible development had already been discussed in other analyses. 
One contribution to the SWP’s 2011 Foresight Study pointed out that the 
largely Albanian-settled areas o f the Western Balkans, which encompass 
Albania, Kosovo (without the majority-Serb northern part) and northern 
Macedonia, are merging into a compact economic, social and political 
unit.5 But at that juncture not a few observers countered that inflated 
declarations from  Tirana and Pristina about the Albanian nation growing
3 Kremlin circles have largely interpreted events in South-East Europe since the collapse 
of Yugoslavia as the outcome of a long-term “Washington strategy” designed to “end by 
all means with the Russian influence in the region”. See Elena Guskova, “Are the Albani­
ans and the Americans Now Deciding the Macedonian Question?” Voltaire Network (Mos­
cow), 13 June 2015, http://voltairenet.org/article187876.html (accessed 22 August 2015).
4 David B. Kanin, “Inertia, Violence, Inertia”, TransConflict, 26 May 2015, http://www. 
transconflict.com/2015/05/inertia-violence-inertia-265 (accessed 23 September 2015).
5 Dusan Reljic, “Border Changes on the Cards again in the Western Balkans”, in Expect the 
Unexpected. Ten Situations to Keep an Eye On, ed. Volker Perthes and Barbara Lippert, SWP 
Research Paper 1/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2011), 31-34, 
http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2012_RP01_lpt_ 
prt.pdf#page=31 (accessed 14 September 2015).
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together would evaporate harmlessly. The West had grown accustomed 
both to the virulent nationalism o f the governing classes and to the fact 
that Tirana and Pristina both spoke deliberately ambiguously about the 
realisation o f national unity. If Albanian politicians got carried away in 
nationalist fervour, the drill was for senior diplomats from Washington, 
Brussels and Berlin to go there and read the riot act to the troublemakers. 
Over and again the admonishers from the West promised that the EU 
accession perspective still existed, but insisted that the candidate countries 
work harder to fulfil the prescribed criteria. The West was relying on en­
thusiasm for joining the European Union, which was stronger among 
Albanians than any other ethnic group in the region, surviving undimin­
ished. But, as anyone who paid close attention realised increasingly clearly 
over the subsequent years, while the Western political dam was still hold­
ing back the nationalist flood, its resilience was steadily crumbling.
The development described in 2011 has continued unbroken in the 
years since. There are now virtually no border controls between areas with 
largely Albanian populations. Cultural homogenisation proceeds apace via 
the mass media. New econom ic links are appearing all the time. A road 
known locally as the “patriotic highway” has been completed between the 
Albanian port o f Durres and Kosovo's capital Pristina. Construction of 
another new motorway from Pristina to Skopje has also begun, passing 
through majority Albanian-settled areas o f Macedonia. And a number of 
the ideas o f Vetevendosje (self-determination) -  the third-largest party 
in the Kosovan parliament and often criticised as radical and “greater Alba­
n ian” -  about the road to national unification are being implemented in 
practice: for example, harm onising the education systems and close co­
ordination on foreign policy. Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama feels com­
pelled to declare that Albania and Kosovo, whose unification is “unavoid­
able and unquestionable”, will have to unite in the “classical way” if their 
convergence with the European Union continues to proceed so slowly.6 
These statements came just days after a jo in t session o f the two govern­
ments in March 2015, held under the m otto “One Land -  One People -  One 
Dream”, where about a dozen agreements concerning “strategic coordina­
tion in the governance o f our common Albania-Kosovo space” were 
signed.7 The popular mood also speaks volumes. For years opinion polls 
have been showing that about three-quarters o f the Albanian population 
in the region want a “Greater Albania”.8
At the beginning o f the decade it was not yet foreseeable how individual 
economic, political and religious factors would amplify dissatisfaction
6 “EU Says Albania Comment on Kosovo Unification ‘Not Acceptable'”, EU Observer, 9 April
2015, https://euobserver.com/foreign/128273 (accessed 22 August 2015).
7 “Meeting of the Two Governments, ‘One Land -  One People -  One Dream'”, address of 
Prime Minister Edi Rama in the joint meeting of the governments of Albania and Kosovo, 
Prime Minister's Office, 23 March 2015, http://www.kryeministria.al/en/newsroom/ 
news/meeting-of-the-two-governments-one-land-one-people-one-dream&page=2 (accessed 
23 September 2015).
8 See Reljic, “Border Changes on the Cards again” (see note 5).
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with the status quo and further inflame nationalist demands. The protracted 
econom ic and financial crisis in the European Union, the prolonged agony 
o f Greece and the slowing o f the Union's enlargement all heavily burden 
its standing in the region.9 Not only is the European Union losing credibil­
ity, but the attraction o f the accession perspective is fading too. The situa­
tion is especially precarious in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the more 
the “European perspective” recedes the more brittle this state becomes. Its 
existence is based less on internal cohesion than on W estern resistance to 
its disintegration. Finally, the prolonged civil war in Syria has emerged as 
a new radicalising factor. Many politicians in the region are well aware of 
the explosive nature o f the mix o f nationalism and religious fanaticism 
around them , and regularly warn their Western mentors o f the risks.10
G l o o m y  P r o s p e c t s :  
S o u t h - E a s t  E u r o p e  W i t h o u t  A d e q u a t e  S e c u r i t y  O r d e r
As before the collapse o f Yugoslavia in 1991, since 2008/2009 we have 
observed a barely concealed race between the “nationalist” and “European” 
options in the shadow o f uncertainty over the future o f South-East Europe. 
Every year that Albania and the other W estern Balkans accession candi­
dates spend in the queue outside the gates o f the European Union pro­
longs their socio-economic decline and deepens their political discord. This 
is what has fed the dream o f abolishing the borders between the Albanian 
areas and unifying the nation in a single state.
The consequences have been felt above all in Macedonia. Events there in 
May 2015 sent an unmistakable warning o f the direction events could take 
if radical forces take the lead: around twenty people were killed in clashes 
between the police and armed Albanians in the north o f the country.11 The 
following years saw a spate o f similar incidents that gradually undermined 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement o f August 2001, mediated by the Euro­
pean Union and the United States. Although the Agreement successfully 
ended fighting between armed Albanians and Macedonian security forces, 
the Western sponsors o f the talks between Macedonian and Albanian poli­
ticians failed to demonstrate any viable alternative for the country's future.
9 In the first half of 2015 alone, 30,000 Albanians citizens and the same number of Alba­
nians from Kosovo applied for asylum in Germany. “Über 218,000 Asylanträge” (Berlin: 
Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 19 August 2015), http://www.bamf.de/Shared 
Docs/Meldungen/DE/2015/20150819-asylgeschaeftsstatistik-juli.html (accessed 23 Septem­
ber 2015).
10 Once 98 percent of his compatriots had believed in America, then in God, then in 
Europe. Today that's not the case, said Prime Minister Rama in July 2015. And if the EU is 
not able to show up in the way that is expected, there will be a huge space for radical 
Islam. “If EU Shuns Albania Radical Islam Beckons”, Financial Times, 3 July 2015, http:// 
blogs.ft.com/the-world/2015/07/if-eu-shuns-albania-radical-islam-beckons (accessed 23 Sep­
tember 2015).
11 “Kosovans Mourn Rebels Killed in Macedonia Shootout”, AFP, 26 May 2015, http:// 
www.businessinsider.com/afp-kosovans-mourn-rebels-killed-in-macedonia-shootout-2015-5 
?IR=T (accessed 23 September 2015).
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The W est’s strategy for dealing with the consequences o f the collapse of 
Yugoslavia is still based, despite all its failures, on a fallacious expectation. 
The accession o f the post-Yugoslavian states and Albania to the European 
Union and NATO, it was hoped, would make the region part o f the inte­
grated Euro-Atlantic space and its security order. This, it was held, would 
undermine the nationalisms in South-East Europe. But this logic increas­
ingly transpired to be illusionary, above all because the European Union 
was fully preoccupied with its own economic and political troubles and 
therefore recoiled from yet more expansion moves.
The European Union and its leading member states would be well ad­
vised to abandon the dogmas o f a rigid enlargement policy and grant the 
W estern Balkan countries at least provisional (partial) m embership sui 
generis. At the same time it is urgently necessary to defuse the region’s 
precarious socio-economic situation, best o f all with the assistance o f em­
ployment-intensive development programmes and generous migration 
arrangements. That might just be enough to prevent the region descend­
ing back into crisis and chaos.
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A b b r e v i a t i o n s
AFP Agence France-Press
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM Asia-Europe Meeting
BAMF Federal Office for Migration and Refugees 
(Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge)
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CNN Cable News Network
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
EASAC European Academies Science Advisory Council
EASO European Asylum Support Office
EEAS European External Action Service
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPARD European Neighbourhood Program for Agriculture and Rural Development
EPC European Policy Centre
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (Rome)
FAS Federation of American Scientists
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
G7 Group of Seven
GFMD Global Forum on Migration and Development
IPBES Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services
KFOR Kosovo Force
NARP Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SIA Sustainability Impact Assessment
TEU Treaty on European Union
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
U.S.C. United States Code
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